U.S. MARINES IN THE
PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991:
ANTHOLOGY AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Major Charles D. Melson
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Evelyn A. Englander
Captain David A. Dawson
U.S. Marine Corps
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1992
Other Publications in the Series
U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991
In Preparation
With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1992
With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm
With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm
With the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert Storm
Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm
Operation Provide Comfort:
U.S. Marine Corps Humanitarian Relief Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991
ii
Foreword
This anthology of articles follows in the tradition of an earlier
publication of the History and Museums Division, THE MARINES IN VIETNAM,
1954-1973: AN ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY. As with the Vietnam
anthology, the purpose of this anthology of articles from the U.S. NAVAL
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, FIELD ARTILLERY, and WASHINGTON
POST; messages and briefings from senior officers; and accompanying task
organization, chronology, and bibliography, is to serve as an interim
reference for use within the Marine Corps and for answering inquiries from
other government agencies and the general public concerning Marine activities
and operations in the Persian Gulf, until the History and Museums Division
completes an intended series of monographs dealing with the major Marine
commands in the area.
The 26 entries comprising this anthology provide a general overview of
Marine involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict. The first five focus on the
Marine Corps' contribution to the American effort to defend Saudi Arabia--
Operation Desert Shield. The second group concentrates on the Marine Corps'
role in the liberation of Kuwait--Operation Desert Storm. Within these two
sections, the entries have been organized to progress from the highest level
of organization, the Marine Expeditionary Force, to the lowest, the platoon,
squad, and individual Marine. The last three entries deal with the aftermath
of the war, and issues raised during the war. Also included is an appendix
consisting of an annotated bibliography of articles that appeared in the U.S.
NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, and NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW, from October 1990 to December 1991. While excellent articles
pertaining to the Persian Gulf have been published in many other periodicals,
due to the limitations of time and resources the History and Museums Division
confined its attention to the three aforementioned publications. Finally, two
additional appendices, one showing the task organization of I Marine
Expeditionary Force in February 1991 and another giving a chronology of
significant events involving Marines in the Persian Gulf from August 1990 to
June 1991, have been included.
I wish to thank the editors of the PROCEEDINGS, GAZETTE, FIELD
ARTILLERY, and WASHINGTON POST for their cooperation in permitting the
reproduction of their
iii
articles. These publications made a significant contribution to the record of
the Marine Corps' participation in the Persian Gulf conflict by originally
publishing these materials. Reproducing them here yields further dividend.
E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
iv
Preface
This anthology is organized into five sections: Operation Desert Shield,
Operation Desert Storm, after Desert Storm, related topics, and appendices.
Within the first two sections, the entries begin with a broad overview and
gradually work down the chain of command to the impressions of the Marine
rifleman. Thus, the first section begins with an article by Brigadier General
Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret), which describes the deployment of Marines to the
Persian Gulf in the broadest terms, and concludes with a report by Henry Allen
describing how individual Marines reacted to their deployment.
The second section opens with materials describing the conflict from the
perspective of Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, USMC, the commander of I
Marine Expeditionary Force. It then moves from the division, wing, and force
service support group level to accounts describing the actions of a regiment,
followed by battalions and a squadron, to conclude with reports of actions by
platoons and squads.
The fourth section consists of an article describing the Marine Corps
role in Operation Provide Comfort, the multinational humanitarian relief
effort extended to the Kurdish refugees after Iraq's defeat.
The fifth section begins with a letter from a Marine to a class of
school-children, which describes his reasons for fighting and also reflects
the tremendous support shown to all servicemen and women by the American
people. Last is an article on relations between the military and the media.
The appendices provide useful references, including the task organization,
chronology, and annotated bibliography.
This collection represents the efforts of a great number of people. Miss
Evelyn A. Englander, the Marine Corps Historical Center librarian, spent a
great deal of time collecting articles from numerous professional journals,
from which Major Charles D. Melson, USMC (Ret), formerly of the History and
Museums Division's Histories Section, made the initial selection of materials
for inclusion in the anthology and the bibliography. Major Melson also
selected all maps with the exception of those that have been reprinted from
the original articles. Miss Cynthia L. Davis of the Madeira School provided
the bulk of the bibliographic annotations under the supervision of Miss
Englander. Captain David A. Dawson, USMC, of the Histories Section, was
responsible for the final selection of entries, and wrote their introductions.
Mrs. Ann A. Ferrante of the Reference Section acquired the task organization
and compiled the chronology.
Mr. Benis M. Frank, Chief Historian, reviewed the materials. Editing and
Design Section staff members Mr. W. Stephen Hill and, particularly, Mrs.
Catherine A. Kerns worked diligently to transform a collection of clippings
into its present form. Colonel Daniel M. Smith, USMC, Deputy Director of
Marine Corps History and Museums, and Brigadier General Simmons, Director of
Marine Corps History and Museums, provided guidance and final review.
v
Although the entries have been reset, and new maps provided for some, all
have been reproduced as faithfully as possible to the original, including
typographical or other errors which may have occurred.
vi
Table of Contents
Original On-Line
Page Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii 5
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 7
"Getting Marines to the Gulf"
Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) . . . . . . . . 1 12
"This Was No Drill"
Interview with Major General John I. Hopkins, USMC . . . . . . 22 33
"Training, Education Were the Keys"
Interview with Brigadier General James A. Brabham, USMC. . . . 34 45
"Squinting at Death: The Desert Snipers"
Henry Allen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 52
"Saudi Christmas: The Marines Banter and Brave the Cold"
Henry Allen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 54
"Message to Members of I Marine Expeditionary Force, 23 Feb 91"
Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, USMC. . . . . . . . . . . 46 57
"CENTCOM News Briefing"
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army . . . . . . . . . . . 47 58
"U.S. Marines in Operation Desert Storm"
Colonel John R. Pope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 86
"Special Trust and Confidence Among the Trail-Breakers"
Interview with Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, USMC . . . 86 97
"Porous Minefield, Dispirited Troops and a Dog named Pow"
Molly Moore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 106
"Allies Used a Variation of Trojan Horse Ploy"
Molly Moore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 112
"Storming the Desert with the Generals"
Molly Moore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105 116
vii
Original On-Line
Page Page
"Marine Air: There When Needed"
Interview with Lieutenant General Royal N. Moore, Jr., USMC. .111 122
"The 1st Marine Division in the Attack"
Interview with Major General J. M. Myatt, USMC . . . . . . . .130 141
"Rolling with the 2d Marine Division"
Interview with Lieutenant General William M. Keys, USMC. . . .146 157
"A War of Logistics"
Interview with Brigadier General Charles C. Krulak, USMC . . .156 167
"The 3d Marines in Desert Storm"
Brigadier General John H. Admire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 174
"F/A-18Ds Go to War"
Captain Rueben A. Padilla, USMC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170 181
"Artillery Raids in Southwestern Kuwait"
Lieutenant Colonel James L. Sachtleben, USMC . . . . . . . . .173 184
"The Opening of DESERT STORM: From the Frontlines"
Major Craig Huddleston, USMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183 194
"Out Front at the Front: Marines Brace for Task of
Clearing Mines"
Molly Moore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185 196
"1st Day of War: `As Scary as You Can Get'"
Molly Moore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .188 199
"If It Didn't Have a White Flag, We Shot It"
Molly Moore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189 200
"Operation PROVIDE COMFORT:
Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq"
Colonel James L. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 202
"Into a Sea of Refugees: HMM-264"
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Byrtus Jr., USMC. . . . . . . . .200 211
"BLT 2/8 Moves South"
Lieutenant Colonel Tony L. Corwin, USMC. . . . . . . . . . . .200 211
"Pushing Logistics to the Limit: MSSG-24"
Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Kohl, USMC . . . . . . . . . . .202 213
viii
Original On-Line
Page Page
"Why We Fought"
Captain Grant K. Holcomb, USMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203 214
"The Fourth Estate as a Force Multiplier"
Colonel John M. Shotwell, USMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 220
Marine Corps Forces in the Persian Gulf Region,
February 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224 235
Persian Gulf War Chronology, August 1990-June 1991 . . . . . .231 242
Selected Annotated Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239 250
ix
In this article, Brigadier General Simmons describes the U.S. Marine Corps'
involvement in the Persian Gulf from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the eve of
Desert Storm. General Simmons places these actions in their global and
historical perspective, emphasizing the unique capabilities provided by a
large and ready expeditionary force.
Getting Marines To the Gulf
By Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May 1991.
Few Americans could have identified Saddam Hussein on Wednesday, 1 August
1990, the day before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In the Marine Corps, the
most interesting things that were happening were taking place in the
Philippines and off the coast of Liberia.
Afloat in Philippine waters was the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit--the
13th MEU--which had sailed from Southern California on 20 June. Originally
scheduled for a port visit at Subic Bay and training ashore, the 13th MEU
found itself conveniently present to assist in earthquake relief. With
Colonel John E. Rhodes as its commander, the MEU included Battalion Landing
Team 1/4, reinforced Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, and MSSG-13, a tailored
combat service support group.
Already ashore at Subic was a contingency Marine air-ground task force
(CMAGTF 4-90) of about 2,000 Marines drawn from the Okinawa-based III Marine
Expeditionary Force, ostensibly for training but also with the purpose of
providing a deterrent against untoward antiAmerican guerrilla or terrorist
activity. The core of CMAGTF 4-90 was the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines.
Halfway around the world, standing off Monrovia, Liberia, in amphibious ships,
was the 22d MEU, with BLT 2/4, HMM-261, MSSG-22, and Colonel Granville R.
Amos, commanding.<1> Civil war had progressed to a point where it was obvious
that the government of President Samuel K. Doe would fall. The 22d MEU was
prepared to evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals.<2>
As Marine Expeditionary Units, the 13th MEU and 22d MEU were two of the
smallest of MAGTFS. With an occasional exception, these formations come in
three sizes, Marine Expeditionary Brigades or MEBs being next larger in size,
and Marine Expeditionary Forces or MEFs being the largest.<3> By doctrine,
MAGTFs must have four organizational elements: a command element, a ground
combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support
element.<4>
Both the 13th MEU and 22d MEU were Marine Expeditionary Units, Special
Operations Capable [MEU (SOC)s], meaning that they had become trained and
practiced in a wide range of special operations. For example, in addition to
being prepared to reinforce beleaguered U.S. embassies and carry out
evacuations, they were trained in a number of other missions, including
boarding
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
FIGURE NOT AVAILABLE
Map
2
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
parties on suspect shipping, operations against terrorists, and amphibious
raids, day or night.<5>
This special-operations capability is something the Corps has developed
to a high art, and it has been a particular interest of the present Commandant
of the Marine Corps. Anyone wishing to understand the Marine Corps must
understand the status of its Commandant. There has been a Commandant,
designated as such, ever since the United States Marine Corps was authorized
by the Congress and approved by President John Adams on 11 July 1798. The
Corps numbers its Commandants, as kings and popes are numbered. The incumbent
is the 28th Commandant. No other service chief seems to have quite the clear
and unequivocal control of his service as that enjoyed by the resident of the
Commandant's House at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. Since 1806, all
Commandants have lived in that house, the oldest official residence in
Washington still being used for its original purpose.<6>
The present Commandant, General Alfred M. ("Al") Gray, is now in the last
year of his four-year tenure. Sixty-two years old, stocky in build, born in
Rahway, New Jersey, and given to chewing tobacco, he spends as little time in
Washington as possible.<7> Gray enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950, reached
the rank of sergeant, was commissioned in 1952, and served with the 1st Marine
Division in Korea. Trained as an artillery officer, he was soon doing more
esoteric things. In the early 1960s, as a young major, he was engaged in some
highly interesting intelligence operations in Vietnam. As a colonel, he
commanded the ground combat element of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade in
the 1975 evacuation of Saigon. Immediately before becoming Commandant in
1987, he was the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and
Commanding General, II Marine Amphibious Force.<8> Before that, he commanded
the 2d Marine Division. He is imaginative, innovative, iconoclastic,
articulate, charismatic, and compassionate. His Marines love him.
Elsewhere in the world on 1 August 1990, the 24th and 26th MEUs were in
predeployment workup training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The 11th MEU
was undergoing special-operations training in California. The 3d Battalion,
9th Marines, embarked in the BELLEAU WOOD (LHA-3), was at Seattle, Washington,
taking part in the annual Sea Fair.<9> An engineer platoon was ashore in
Sierra Leone, as part of a West Africa training cruise, working with local
forces and keeping an eye cocked towards neighboring Liberia. A Marine
detachment in the Caribbean was engaged in anti-drug trafficking operations,
and another detachment was operating with other federal agents along our
Southwest border. A reinforced battalion from the 7th Marine Regiment was
undergoing mountain warfare training in California's Sierra Nevada mountains.
Elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade were exercising in Hawaii.
Then came the second day of August. At about 0100 local time, in opening
moves reminiscent of North Korea's invasion of South Korea 40 years earlier,
three Iraqi Republican Guard divisions crossed the Kuwaiti border and began
converging on the capital of Kuwait City from the north and west, coordinating
their movement with the landing by helicopter of a special-operations division
in the city itself. The forces had linked up by 0530 and by nightfall, Kuwait
3
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
FIGURE NOT AVAILABLE
Map of Southwest Asia
City was in Iraqi hands. By noon of the next day, the Iraqis had reached
Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia.<10>
On Saturday, 4 August, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Colin L. Powell, and the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, General H.
Norman ("the Bear" or "Stormin' Norman") Schwarzkopf, both Army generals, met
with President George Bush and key members of his administration at Camp
David, Maryland. This was a day of decision.
Two days later, the 26th MEU(SOC), Colonel William C. Fite III,
commanding, began to load out at Morehead City, North Carolina. The three
major elements were BLT 3/8, HMM-162, and MSSG-26. The 26th MEU(SOC)'s Navy
counterpart was Amphibious Squadron Two.<11> The deployment of
4
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
the 26th MEU(SOC) on 6 August was a scheduled rotation that had nothing to do
with the Gulf crisis. The 26th MEU(SOC) was to relieve the 22d MEU(SOC) on
station near Liberia on 20 August. Meanwhile, the 22d MEU(SOC) had begun
evacuation operations and had put a reinforced rifle company ashore to protect
the U.S. Embassy.
On 7 August, JCS Chairman Powell, as directed by Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney, ordered the first actual deployment of forces for Operation
Desert Shield. By definition, this was C-Day--Commencement Day. The clock
for Desert Shield had begun to tick.
In the case of the Marine Corps, the 1st MEB in Hawaii, the 7th MEB in
California, and the 4th MEB on the East Coast were alerted for possible
deployment.<12>
FIGURE NOT AVAILABLE
Map of The Kuwait Theater Of Operations
5
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Marines have been deploying by brigades for more than a hundred years.
The first expeditionary brigade worth counting was the one that went to Panama
in 1885. At the turn of the century, another brigade marched to the relief of
the embassies in Peking, shouldering aside the Boxers, then returning to the
Philippines for service against Aguinaldo's insurgents.
When the Marine Advance Base Force, the forerunner of today's Fleet
Marine Forces, was formed in 1913, it was a brigade of two small regiments.
It also had an aviation detachment: two primitive flying boats. The Advance
Base Brigade had its first expeditionary testing at Vera Cruz in 1914.
Unfortunately, the aviation detachment did not go along. There was no
convenient way to get the short-legged flying boats from New Orleans to Vera
Cruz other than to take them apart and put them into boxes.
In 1917, after the United States entered World War I, it was planned that
Marine aviation would support the Marine brigade that was sent to France, and
which figured prominently at such places as Belleau Wood, Soissons, Blanc
Mont, and the Meuse-Argonne. But the 1st Marine Aviation Force-four squadrons
of DH-4 DeHavillands--which reached France in late summer 1918, was used as
the Day Wing of the Navy Bombing Group, far from where the Marine brigade was
engaged.
Between World Wars I and II, the Marine Corps sent small expeditionary
brigades to Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and China. In every
case, these brigades had an organic aviation clement. These bush-war Marine
aviators of the 1920s and 1930s did not invent dive bombing or its handmaiden,
close air support, as Marines sometimes like to claim, but they did do a great
deal to develop those concepts and make them work.
In 1933, when the old-style East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces
became the Fleet Marine Forces, there was a 1st Marine Brigade based at
Quantico and a 2d Brigade based at San Diego. Each had its own aircraft
group. At about this time, Marine squadrons began qualifying for
aircraft-carrier operations. This carrier qualification cross-training has
continued.
In early 1941 the 1st Marine Brigade became the 1st Marine Division and
the 2d Marine Brigade became the 2d Marine Division. Correspondingly, the
East and West Coast air groups became the 1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings.
Early World War II Marine Corps deployments were made in brigade strength. In
the summer of 1941, a 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was pulled out of the new
2d Marine Division, formed in 15 days, and sent to garrison Iceland. In
January 1942, a 2d Brigade was taken out of the 2d Division and sent to
American Samoa. Two months later, a 3d Brigade was stripped out of the 1st
Marine Division and dispatched to Western Samoa. In 1944, a two-regiment 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade (entirely different from the brigade that went to
Ireland) was formed for the re-occupation of Guam. But the aphorism is that
"The Marine Corps deploys by brigades, but fights by divisions." Thus it was
that by the end of World War II, the Corps had expanded to six Marine
divisions and five aircraft wings, and close air support had been developed to
a fine art.
6
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
After the war, the Marine Corps shrank to a point where it could barely
man the skeletons of two divisions and two aircraft wings. When the Korean
War erupted on 25 June 1950, the Marine Corps hurriedly stripped down the 1st
Marine Division to form a provisional brigade. This brigade landed at Pusan
on 2 August and, with the support of a Marine aircraft group with three
fighter-bomber squadrons, two of them carrier-based, had a great deal to do
with the successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter. On 15 September, this
brigade would join with its parent 1st Marine Division, now fleshed out with
Reserves, for the landing at Inchon. The 1st Marine Division and the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing remained in Korea for the remainder of the war and turned
in a good performance, both in the air and on the ground, but not without some
jurisdictional and doctrinal problems with the Fifth Air Force.<13>
The four Marine battalion landing teams that landed in Lebanon in 1958
were brought together into the brigade size 2d Provisional Marine Force.
After that, the time-hallowed term "provisional" fell into disuse. By the
early 1960s the MAGTF concept had crystallized and the MEU, MEB, MEF triad had
emerged. The Dominican Intervention of 1965 saw the initial employment of the
6th Marine Expeditionary Unit and a buildup to the 4th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade.
In Vietnam, the first substantial commitment of U.S. ground combat forces
was on 8 March 1965, when the 9th MEB landed at Da Nang. It had, of course,
its aviation element. The 9th MEB was followed on 7 May by the landing of the
3d MEB at Chu Lai, some 55 miles south of Da Nang. Both brigades were then
absorbed into the III Marine Expeditionary Force, which quickly had its name
changed to the III Marine AMPHIBIOUS Force because it was presumed that the
South Vietnamese had unhappy memories of the French EXPEDITIONARY Corps.
Eventually, the III Marine Amphibious Force would include two Marine
divisions, two Marine regimental combat teams, and a huge 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing, but this took several years, with battalions and squadrons being fed
into the country one at a time. In Vietnam, there were also jurisdictional
and doctrinal problems concerning the use of tactical aviation, this time with
the Seventh Air Force.
The 1958 intervention in Lebanon had been a near bloodless success. This
would not be the case with the Marine "presence" in Lebanon that began in
August 1982 with the landing at Beirut of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit. In
the ensuing months, the 32d MAU was relieved by the 24th MAU which, in turn,
was relieved by the 22d MAU (actually the redesignated 32d MAU). Then the
24th MAU returned once again and was there on that fatal Sunday morning, 23
October 1983, when the suicide truck-bomb destroyed the headquarters building
of BLT 1/8, killing 241 U.S. servicemen, most of them Marines, and wounding 70
more.
The 22d MAU was routinely on its way from the East Coast to relieve the
24th MAU when it was diverted for the Grenada intervention, landing on that
little island on 25 October and, after a week ashore, re-embarking and
proceeding to Lebanon.
7
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
The designation of MAGTFs as "amphibious" rather than "expeditionary"
continued until 1988, when General Gray put things back the way they had been,
to reflect more accurately Marine Corps missions and capabilities. Said
General Gray in explaining this change: "The Marine air-ground forces which we
forward deploy around the world are not limited to amphibious operations
alone. Rather, they are capable of projecting sustained, combined arms combat
power ashore in order to conduct a wide range of missions essential to the
protection of our national security interests."
For Operation Desert Shield, if the 1st and 7th Marine Expeditionary
Brigades were to be deployed, as planned, by air, they would be taking
virtually nothing with them but their individual arms and equipment.<14> That
would not give them much combat potential. It was expected that their heavy
equipment and supplies would be borne to the scene by the Maritime
Prepositioning Force.
In early 1980, then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown testified to the
Congress: "Although we can lift a brigade size force [by air] to the scene of
a minor contingency very quickly, that force would be relatively lightly armed
. . . ." To supply such a force by air with substantial mechanized or armored
support, along with necessary ammunition, he went on, would occupy almost all
of DoD's airlift force.
Dr. Brown's recommended solution to this problem was to preposition
squadrons of commercial ships at strategic locations, each squadron loaded
with most of a MEB's combat equipment and about 30 days of supply.
Thirteen modern ships, with civilian crews, eventually were dedicated to
this concept. By the summer of 1990, there were three Maritime Prepositioning
Shipping Squadrons in being: MPSRon-1 in the Atlantic, MPSRon-2 in the Indian
Ocean, and MPSRon-3 in the Western Pacific.<15> These ships did not need
ports; they could offload either at a pier or in the stream. But they did
need a benign environment. They were not a substitute for amphibious ships,
which have an assault capability. Skeptics, among them many old-guard
Marines, questioned their usefulness. It was dangerous, it was argued, to
separate a Marine from his pack. A marriage of men and material on a
potential battlefield was problematic. Desert Shield would provide an acid
test for the MPS concept.
On 8 August (C + 2), Maritime Prepositioning Shipping Squadron 2 sailed
from Diego Garcia-that speck of an island in the middle of the Indian Ocean--
and Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3 sailed from Guam. Destination for both
squadrons was the Persian Gulf. MPSRon2 was to marry up with 7th MEB, and
MPSRon-3 with 1st MEB, if and when those two MEBs deployed.
On 10 August (C + 3), CinCCent, that is, General Schwarzkopf, did indeed
call not only for the airlifted 1st and 7th MEBs but also for the seaborne 4th
MEB. No two MEBs are exactly alike in structure; they are task-organized.
The size of a brigade can easily vary from 7,000 to 17,000 troops or more,
mostly Marines, but also a considerable number of Navy men, because the
Corps's medical support and its chaplains, plus some engineering help, come
from the Navy.
8
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
General Schwarzkopf had succeeded Marine General George B. Crist on 23
November 1988 as commander of CentCom, with a staff of 675. In June 1990,
Marine Major General Robert B. Johnston joined his command as chief of staff.
Johnston, born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1937, emigrated to this country in
1955, and came into the Marine Corps by way of a commission in 1961, after
graduating from San Diego State College. As a junior officer, he had two
tours in Vietnam, including command of a rifle company. Subsequently, he
would have the peacetime command of a battalion, a regiment, and of the 9th
Marine Amphibious Brigade.
On 12 August (C + 5), the 7th MEB, moving out from its desert base at
Twentynine Palms, California, with nearly 17,000 personnel, entered the air
flow for Saudi Arabia.<16> The planning figure was that the deployment of a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade by air required 250 C-141 sorties or equivalents.
It was no accident that 7th MEB was desert-trained. The brigade had long been
earmarked for employment in CentCom's sandy area of operations.
The first elements of the 7th MEB arrived at Al Jubayl on 14 August (C +
7). The brigade commander, Major General John I. Hopkins, arrived the next
day, as did the first ships of MPSRon-2, and the marriage of the 7th MEB and
MPSRon-2 was consummated. Rolling out of the MPS ships came the tanks,
howitzers, amphibious assault vehicles, light armored vehicles, and the other
weapons, supplies, and equipment which would give the 7th MEB its combat
punch. On 20 August its ground elements occupied their initial defensive
positions in northeastern Saudi Arabia. They were ready for combat.
7th MEB's commander, General Hopkins, a 58-year-old New Yorker raised in
Brooklyn and a 1956 graduate of the Naval Academy, is a tough Marine and looks
the part. A ground officer, he has a Silver Star from Vietnam and a Master's
degree gained at the University of Southern California from part-time study.
On 25 August (C + 18), General Hopkins, as CG I MEF(Forward), fully
confident that he could counter an Iraqi offensive in his zone of action,
reported to General Schwarzkopf that he was ready to assume responsibility for
the defense of the approaches to the vital seaport of Al Jubayl. His brigade,
numbering on that date 15,248 Marines with 123 tanks, 425 heavy weapons,
including artillery pieces, and 124 fixed and rotary winged aircraft, had made
a 12,000-mile strategic movement, using 259 MAC sorties and five MPS ships.
The 7th MEB's ground combat element was Regimental Landing Team 7 (RLT-7) with
four infantry battalions and a light armored infantry battalion. The latter
was equipped with the light armored vehicle (LAV) developed by General Motors
of Canada, based on the Swiss Piranha. The LAV is a wheeled, rather than
tracked vehicle, and is classified as an 8-by-8, meaning that it has four
rubber-tired driving wheels on a side. It comes in a number of variants, but
the basic LAV-25-so called because it mounts a 25mm "chain" gun, with its
three-man crew-is primarily a troop carrier for six Marines, well-suited for
light infantry and reconnaissance missions in the desert. It had, in fact,
been tested in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1980s.
9
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
The combat service support element was Brigade Service Support Group 7
(BSSG-7).
The aviation combat element was Marine Aircraft Group 70 (MAG-70). A
kind of pocket air force, MAG-70 had both fixed-wing and helicopter squadrons,
toying a great variety of aircraft. Its fighter-attack aircraft was the
F/A-18 Hornet, which the Marine Corps considers to be the best combination
fighter and attack aircraft in the world. Its attack aircraft were the AV-8B
Harrier and the A6E Intruder. The Harrier is a true vertical takeoff and
landing aircraft. The Marines are the only U.S. service that has this
British-designed aircraft.<17>
The Corps's heavy helicopters are the CH-53D Sea Stallion and the CH-53E
Super Stallion, its medium helicopter is the CH-46 Sea Knight, and for light
helicopters the Corps has the AH-1W Super Cobra and the UH-1N, last in a long
line of Hueys.
MAG-70 also had a detachment of KC-130s. The Marine Corps version of the
Hercules serves both as a refueler and a transport.
The Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, Major General Royal N.
Moore, Jr, had arrived in the objective area on 16 August, one day after
General Hopkins. Born in Pasadena, California, in 1935, Moore had come into
the Marine Corps through the Naval Aviation Cadet program, being commissioned
in 1958. He has a bachelor's degree from Chapman College. He is both a
fixed-wing and helicopter pilot. In Vietnam he flew 287 combat missions,
primarily in high-performance reconnaissance and electronics countermeasures
aircraft, and received the Distinguished Flying Cross and 18 Air Medals. His
first task in Saudi Arabia was to determine the bed-down sites for the
arriving Marine Corps squadrons. Fixed-wing squadrons went to Marine Aircraft
Group 11 and helicopter squadrons to Marine Aircraft Group 16. Shortly after
his arrival Moore publicly predicted a short, violent air war against the
Iraqis.
On 17 August (C + 10), the first echelon of the 4th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade, with forces drawn from North and South Carolina bases and air
stations, sailed from Morehead City. The brigade, numbering about 8,000,
included RLT-2, MAG-40, and BSSG. To move 4th MEB, Atlantic-based Amphibious
Group Two, with Amphibious Squadrons Six and Eight, divided itself into three
Transit Groups of about five ships each. Transit Group 2 would sail on 20
August and Transit Group 3 on 22 August.<18>
Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., the 52-year-old commanding general
of 4th MEB, is another Californian. A graduate of San Jose State College, he
also has a Master's degree from the University of Wisconsin. Commissioned in
1960, he commanded a rifle company in Vietnam as a captain.
On 25 August (C + 18), the air flow of the 1st Marine Expeditionary
Brigade from Hawaii began. The core of 1st MEB was the 3d Marines, with two
infantry battalions. No command element was sent, for there was already a
sufficient Marine Corps command structure in Saudi Arabia to receive the 1st
MEB's ground and aviation components. On 26 August, MPSRon-3 arrived at Al
Jubayl from Guam, and the marriage of 1st MEB and MPSRon-3 proceeded.
On 2 September (C + 26), the I Marine Expeditionary Force assumed
operational control of all Marine forces in CentCom's theater of operations. I
10
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
MEF was formed by "compositing" or fitting together the elements of the 7th
MEB and 1st MEB. In Marine Corps language, the 7th MEB "stood down" on that
date. Either "deactivated" or "dissolved" would be much too strong a word;
7th MEB could be readily reconstituted if the situation required it. Major
General Hopkins, the commanding general of the 7th MEB, now became the deputy
commander of I MEF.
I MEF's command element had come from Camp Pendleton, California. The
commanding general, Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, arrived at Riyadh on
17 August. Boomer is a North Carolinian, commissioned in the Marine Corps in
1960 after graduating from Duke University. As a captain he had two tours in
Vietnam, the first as a rifle company commander and the second as an advisor
to a Vietnamese Marine Corps battalion. He is an outdoorsman, whose favorite
pastime is hunting. He received a Master's degree in technology of management
from the American University in 1973, and then taught at the Naval Academy.
As do most general officers, he has a chest full of ribbons, but the most
significant are his two Silver Stars from Vietnam. Silver Stars require
gallantry in action and are not given lightly by the Marine Corps. He had
taken command of I MEF at Camp Pendleton on 8 August, immediately before
deployment, coming from command of the Reserve 4th Marine Division. He is now
52 years old.
At the same ceremony, Brigadier General James M. Myatt became the new
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division. Myatt had been commissioned a
second lieutenant in the Marine Corps after graduating from Sam Houston State
University in Texas. Later he would receive a master of science degree in
engineering electronics from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California. He served two tours in vietnam, the first as a platoon leader and
company commander and the second as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marines. He,
too, has a Silver Star.
On 5 September (C + 29) the 1st Marine Division "stood up," signifying
that the headquarters of the division was in place, having arrived from Camp
Pendleton, and was ready to assume control of the ground combat element of I
MEF.<20>
By 6 September, the three major subordinate headquarters of I MEF were in
place: the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 1st Force
Service Support Group, the last commanded by Brigadier General James A.
Brabham, Jr. General Brabham is a native Pennsylvanian, born in 1939, and a
1962 civil-engineering graduate of Cornell University. During the first of
his two Vietnam tours, he commanded a company in a shore party battalion;
during the second he was an engineer advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
Like General Boomer, he had a tour on the faculty of the Naval Academy. In
recent years Brabham had been the Deputy J-4 at USCentCom, an almost ideal
preparation for his present assignment. In addition to being the commanding
general of the 1st Force Service Support Group, he also functioned as
ComUSMarCent; that is, commander of the Marine component of the Central
Command until General Boomer's arrival.
11
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Consistent with existing doctrine and plans, General Schwarzkopf had
directed that USMarCent be established as a service component along with Air
Force (USAFCent), Navy (USNavCent), Army (USArCent), and Special Operations
Command (SOCCent).<21> ComUSMarCent would have operational control of all
Marine forces ashore.
Meanwhile, the 13th MEU(SOC), embarked in PhibRon 5, was on its way from
the Philippines, arriving in the Gulf of Oman on 7 September.<22> Another
name for PhibRon 5 with its embarked MEU was Amphibious Ready Group "A" or
"ARG Alpha."
A second ready group, ARG Bravo, was also activated in the Western
Pacific and dispatched to the Gulf, carrying a bob-tailed MAGTF 6-90 under
command of Colonel Ross A. Brown and including the headquarters of RLT, BLT
1/6, and a combat service support detachment.<23> Back in the Philippines,
elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade continued to be involved in
flood relief in the well-named Operation Mud Pack.
Recognizing the operational flexibility offered by an embarked amphibious
force, General Schwarzkopf had decided to keep both the 4th MEB and 13th
MEU(SOC) afloat. Command lines here would run from USCinCCent to ComUSNavCent
(who was also Commander, Seventh Fleet) to CATF Commander, Amphibious Task
Force), to CLF (Commander, Landing Force). General Jenkins, as CG 4th MEB and
CLF, would also have operational control of the 13th MEU(SOC).
On 11 September the first echelon of the 4th MEB arrived in the Gulf of
Oman in Transit Group 1. By 17 September, all three transit groups were in
the Gulf of Oman, just outside the Persian Gulf, and the amphibious task force
began to plan for landing rehearsals. The first of these landing exercises,
which would have the code name "Sea Soldier," began with a night amphibious
raid by the 13th MEU(SOC) followed by the 4th MEB landing across the beaches
of Oman by both helicopter and surface craft.
The workhorses for the surface landing were the Marine Corps' amphibian
tractors. In 1985 the Marine Corps changed the designation of the LVTP7A1 to
AAV7A1--amphibious assault vehicle-representing a shift in emphasis away from
the long-time LVT designation, meaning "landing vehicle, tracked." Without a
change of a bolt or plate, the AAV7A1 was to be more of an armored personnel
carrier and less of a landing vehicle. The LVTP7, which had come into the
Marine Corps inventory in the early 1970s, was a quantum improvement over the
short-ranged LVTP5 of the Vietnam era. Weighing in at 26 tons (23,991 kg)
combat-loaded, and with a three-man crew, it can carry 25 Marines. With a
road speed of 45 mph (72 km/h), it is also filly amphibious with water speeds
up to 8 mph (13 km/h). It is not as heavily armed or armored as the Army's
Bradley infantry fighting vehicle; on the other hand, the M2A1 Bradley carries
only seven troop passengers.
About this time, I MEF learned that the 7th Armored Brigade ("Desert
Rats") of the British Army of the Rhine was to come under I MEF's operational
control.<24> The Desert Rats, numbering some 14,000 soldiers, had earned their
name fighting with the British Eighth Army in North Africa in World War II,
12
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
but it had been a long time since they served in the desert. Their fighting
vehicles, however, had names that seemed well-suited to the task hand:
Challengers, Warriors, Scimitars, and Scorpions, The Challenger tank is
roughly equivalent to the American M60A3. The Warrior is an armored personnel
carrier chosen by the British after competition with the American Bradley.
The Scimitars and Scorpions are tracked reconnaissance vehicles that might be
called very light tanks.
Going into Desert Shield, the Marines' main battle tank was the M60A1, an
improvement, several generations removed, of the M48 tank of the Korean and
Vietnam wars. Weighing 58 tons (52,617 kg) and with a crew of four--
commander, gunner, loader, and driver--the M60A1 has as its main armament a
105mm gun. Retrofitted with applique armor, it is considered roughly equal
to, if lesser-gunned than the best tank in the Iraqi inventory, the much-
vaunted Soviet T-72.
The T-72, which came into service in the late 1970s, was successfully met
by the Israelis in Lebanon in 1982. Armed with a long-barreled, smooth-bored
125mm gun and with a three-man crew, the T-72 at 45 tons (41,000 kg) is
considerably lighter than the Marine Corps's M60A1. Both tanks have six road
wheels on a side but the T-72 with its squat hull and long-barreled gun is
distinctive in silhouette from the MO, with its more massive turret. In the
South Atlantic, the 26th MEU(SOC) had arrived on schedule off Monrovia, on 20
August, and began the relief of 22d MEU(SOC). By that time 683 persons had
been evacuated and the Marine presence ashore had been reduced to half a
company. Next day, 26th MEU(SOC) received a change of mission. It was to
proceed to the Mediterranean, leaving behind the USS WHIDBEY ISLAND (LSD-41)
and BARNSTABLE COUNTY (LST-1197) and a heavily reinforced rifle company (Co
K/3/8), along with helicopters and a combat service support detachment to
continue evacuation operations and protection of the embassy. This
detachment, under command of Major George S. Hartley, picked up the informal
name of "Monrovia MAGTF."
By C + 60, during the first week of November, Phase I of the Desert
Shield deployment was complete. Nearly 42,000 Marines, close to one-quarter
of the Marine Corps's total active duty strength and a fifth of the total U.S.
force in Desert Shield, had been deployed. More than 31,000 were ashore in I
MEF. The remainder, the 4th MEB and 13th MEU(SOC), were kept afloat as the
landing force of a strong amphibious task force.
But there was much more to come. During an 8 November press conference,
President Bush indicated that U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf area would be
increased by an additional 200,000 troops. Amplifying news stories
conjectured that the number of Marines in the objective area would be doubled
by the addition of the II Marine Expeditionary Force from the Corps's East
Coast bases and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from California.<25> The
Corps's Commandant, General Gray, added a footnote to the conjecture:
13
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
"There are four kinds of Marines: those in Saudi Arabia,
those going to Saudi Arabia, those who want to go to
Saudi Arabia, and those who don't want to go to Saudi
Arabia but are going anyway."
It was a point of pride with the Marine Corps that it had completed Phase
I deployments without any callup of the Marine Corps Reserve, except for a few
individuals who volunteered for active duty to fill mobilization billets. The
President's decision to expand the force changed that.
On 13 November, for Phase II, the involuntary callup of Selected Marine
Corps Reserve units began. These units were drawn from all over the country
from the widely dispersed Reserve 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft
Wing. They were needed to sustain the forces already deployed and to round
out the additional forces that were to be sent.
A large-scale amphibious exercise, with the foreboding code name
"Imminent Thunder," was held near the head of the Persian Gulf, beginning 18
November. Uncertain landing conditions were created by shallow water and high
winds and the amphibious task force commander cancelled the surface assault
because of the sea state. The media got on to this, chattering about the
fragility of amphibious landings, not accepting the obvious explanation that
in an actual operation the landing could have been made, but that you don't
risk the unnecessary breakup of landing craft and vehicles in an exercise.
The helicopterborne part of the assault, launched from over the horizon, went
well. A Marine battalion landing team coming from the sea linked up with I
MEF forces ashore. Air support was not only Marine, Navy, and Air Force, but
also British and French.
The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, numbering about 7,500, sailed from
San Diego on the first of December in the 13 ships of Amphibious Group
Three.<26> The last operational deployment of the 5th MEB had been in 1962,
when it went through the Panama Canal to take station in the Caribbean during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ground element core of the 5th MEB was the
reinforced 5th Marine regiment from Camp Pendleton; the aviation element,
MAG-50; and the combat service support element, BSSG-50.
Brigadier General Peter J. Rowe was in command. From Connecticut and now
52 years old, he had been commissioned in 1962 after graduation from
Cincinnati's Xavier University. Later he would take a master's degree at San
Diego State University. In the Vietnam War, after completing Vietnamese
language training, he had commanded an interrogation-translation team in the
battles for Hue City and Khe Sanh. Before getting command of the 5th MEB, he
had been assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division.
The 5th MEB's schedule called for it to arrive at Subic Bay on 26
December, for a brief training period. Then on 1 January, it was to proceed
so as to drive in the area of operations by 15 January. "Embedded" in 5th MEB
was the 11th MEU(SOC)--meaning that the 11th MEU(SOC) could be reconstituted
for missions such as those being per-formed by 13th MEU(SOC).
14
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
On the East Coast, the II Marine Expeditionary Force consisted
essentially of the 2d Marine Division and 2d Force Service Support Group,
based mainly at Camp Lejeune, and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, based largely
at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina. II MEF called
itself the "Carolina MAGTF" and it bore the imprint of General Gray's time as
Commanding General, 2d Marine Division (1981-84), and Commanding General,
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (1984-87).
In command was the current FMFLant commander, Lieutenant General Carl E.
Mundy, originally of Atlanta, Georgia. Commissioned in the Marine Corps in
1957 after graduation from Auburn University, he had served as an operations
officer and executive officer of an infantry battalion. Later, his string of
operational commands would include the 36th and 38th MAUs and the 4th MAB.
Immediately before his assignment to FMFLant in July 1990, he had been the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations at Headquarters,
Marine Corps. But he was not destined to go to the Persian Gulf immediately.
Nearly 30,000 Marines and sailors from II MEF were scheduled for the
Gulf. Movement of the fly-in echelon (FIE) began on 9 December and was to
continue, at the rate of about 1,000 troops per day, until 15 January. Part
of I-I MEF's logistic support would come from MPSRon1, which left the East
Coast on 14 November with a scheduled arrival date at Al Jubayl of 12
December.
The departure of the major part of II MEF for the Gulf was marked by an
elaborate farewell ceremony at Camp Lejeune on Monday, 10 December, which saw
24,000 departing troops drawn up in massive squares on the parade ground.
Both the Commandant, General Gray, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, Admiral Powell F. Carter, were there to wish them well. Perhaps the
most impressive part of the parade was the massing of the scarlet-and-gold
colors of II MEF and its subordinate units.<27>
But of the major elements, only the colors of the 2d Division and 2d
Force Service Support Group would be going to the Gulf, it having been decided
that there was not yet a requirement for the command elements of II Marine
Expeditionary Force and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. The deploying aviation
units would be joining the already deployed 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. Thus on
15 January, the I Marine Expeditionary Force would be structured very much
like the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam: two divisions, a very large
wing,<28> and a substantial service support command.<29> In addition there
would be two Marine Expeditionary Brigades and a special-operations-capable
Marine Expeditionary Unit afloat, offering a very powerful landing force for
any contemplated amphibious operations.
Except for a demonstration incident to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the
2d Marine Division had not been operationally deployed since World War II,
where it fought with great distinction at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, and
Tinian.<30> Reminiscent of expeditionary practices before World War I, a
rifle company was stripped out of the ceremonial guard at the Marine Barracks,
Washington, D.C., and sent to Saudi Arabia, as well.
15
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Commanding the 2d Marine Division was Major General William M. Keys,
Pennsylvanian who had graduated from the Naval Academy in 1960. During his
first tour in Vietnam he commanded a rifle company; during his second he was
an advisor to the Vietnamese Marines at the battalion and brigade level. He
has both a Navy Cross and a Silver Star. A graduate of the National War
College, he also holds a Master's degree from the American University.
Peacetime operational commands had included both a battalion and a regiment.
The new year brought an unexpected diversion of forces from Desert Shield.
On Thursday, 3 January, a cable arrived in Washington from the U.S. Embassy in
Mogadishu, Somalia, requesting immediate evacuation. A two-week urban battle
had reached its climax and the government of the octogenarian president,
Mohamed Siad Barre, was collapsing. Armed looters had entered the embassy
compound. Orders went out to Seventh Fleet. The TRENTON (LPD-14), operating
the Indian Ocean, launched two CH-53Es loaded with 70 Marines. The distance
was 460 miles; nighttime aerial refueling was done twice from Marine KC-130s
flying from Bahrain. The helicopters arrived over Mogadishu early Friday
morning, 4 January, and sat down just inside the embassy gate. Part of the
Marine detachment secured the perimeter of the luxurious ($35 million)
compound, big enough to include a nine-hole golf course. The rest of the
Marines sallied forth into the corpse-littered streets to bring in stranded
Americans and other foreign nationals, including the Soviet ambassador and his
staff of 35 from the Soviet Embassy a mile away. By now more than 260 persons
were in the embassy compound. The hired security guards were holding off the
looters with small arms fire. A rocket-propelled grenade had impacted on an
Embassy building. The two CH-53Es took out 62 evacuees on Friday.<31> The
next day, Saturday, 5 January, five CHA6 helicopters from the GUAM (LPH-9),
which had closed the distance to Mogadishu, continued the evacuation.
Altogether more than 260 people were taken out, including 30 nationalities and
senior diplomats from ten countries.
Just prior to 15 January the British 7th Armored Brigade was detached to
rejoin its parent, the 1st Armored Division, which had arrived in Saudi
Arabia. The Desert Rats were to be replaced by the 1st Brigade, 2d U.S.
Armored Division-the "Tiger Brigade" -some 4,200 soldiers equipped with more
than a hundred M1A1 Abrams tanks and a large number of M2A2 Bradley infantry
fighting vehicles.
The Marine Corps had not been scheduled to get its first M1A1 Abrams, the
U.S. Army's premier main-battle tank, until November 1990, with an initial
operational capability not expected until late 1991. General Gray met with
General Carl E. Vuono, the Army's Chief of Staff, and asked for the loan of
some Army M1A1s. By the first part of January 1991, with U.S. Army
cooperation, I MEF had a significant number of M1A1s, considered the most
modern tank in the world. Slightly heavier at 63 tons (57,154 kg) than the
M60A1, the M1A1's most recognizable visual differences are its skirted seven
road-wheels and long turret, mounting a 120-mm. smooth-bore gun.
By the 15th of January the Marine Corps had something close to 84,000
troops in the objective area, almost half its active duty strength.<32> Of
this total,
16
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
some 66,000 (just over a thousand of whom were female Marines) were ashore
with I MEF. Afloat were the 4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU(SOC)-almost 18,000
Marines. Taken together, these forces were close to the number of Marines
deployed to Vietnam in the peak year of 1968 and more than the total landed at
Iwo Jima in 1945.
Obviously, the Marine Corps's deployment to the Persian Gulf,
constituting as it did the largest Marine Corps movement since World War II,
was dependent on the sealift provided by the Navy and airlift provided by the
Air Force. Both the sealift and airlift were magnificent.
Contingency plans for deployment to the Persian Gulf--for all Services,
not just the Marine Corps--appear to have worked amazingly well. U.S.
deployments to the region were a logistical triumph. In the Korean War,
under-strength, under-trained, and poorly equipped American troops were flung
into battle piecemeal in an act of desperation. In some cases performance was
poor, and in many cases losses were frightful. In the Vietnam War, the state
of readiness of the armed forces was much better than Korea and often
outstanding-but they were fed into the objective area with a deliberate
slowness, reflecting the gradualism of the Johnson-McNamara strategy.
This time, as exemplified by the deployment of the Marines, the crux of
the Bush-Cheney-Powell strategy was to position a superbly equipped and highly
trained force in sufficient numbers on the anticipated battlefield.
17
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Notes
1. Amphibious Squadron Four (PhibRon 4): USS SAIPAN (LHA-2), PONCE (LPD-15),
and SUMTER, (LST-1181).
2. Such evacuations from troubled spots around the world have been a Marine
Corps mission almost from its inception. For a complete account of this
effort--Operation Sharp Edge--see pp. 102-106 of this issue.
3. Special Purpose Forces might be considered a fourth type of MAGTF. These
are small task-organized forces configured, as the name implies, for special
purposes. Recent use of Special Purpose Forces by the Marines includes
operations in Panama (Operation Just Cause) and in the Persian Gulf (Operation
Earnest Will).
4. The commander of a MEB is ordinarily a brigadier or major general. The
ground combat element is ordinarily a Regimental Landing Team. The aviation
element is ordinarily a composite Marine Aircraft Group. The fourth element
is the all-important Brigade Service Support Group. The repetition of the
word "ordinarily" is intentional; there is no fixed organization for a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. Similarly, a Marine Expeditionary Unit ordinarily is
commanded by a colonel and will include a Battalion Landing Team, a reinforced
Helicopter Squadron, and a Service Support Group. A Marine Expeditionary
Force, commanded by a major general or lieutenant general, will ordinarily
have a Division, an Aircraft Wing, and a Force Service Support Group.
5. All MAGTFs have inherent special-operations capabilities. Before
deployment, MEUs undergo demanding comprehensive training leading to formal
certification and designation as Special Operations Capable."
6. Although the British burned the White House in 1814, they left the
Commandant's House unharmed, possibly because their commanding general was
staying there.
7. As of 15 January, General Gray had been to Saudi Arabia three times to
visit his troops.
8. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (CG FMFLant), is also
the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Europe (CG FMFEur), with a small
planning staff in London.
9. When CG I MEF asked ComPhibGru-3 for the immediate return of BELLEAU WOOD
from Seattle, she steamed back to San Diego that night. The 3d Battalion, 9th
Marines disembarked and readied itself for air embarkation.
10. To put things into geographic perspective, look at the map of the Arabian
peninsula and see it as a land mass as large as the United States east of the
Mississippi. To the left or southwest is the Red Sea. To the right or
northeast are the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz that form a choke point,
and the Gulf of Oman. To the southeast are the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian
Sea.
11. Amphibious Squadron Two (PhibRon 2) consisted of the INCHON (LPH-12),
NASHVILLE (LPD-13), WHIDBEY ISLAND (LSD-41), FAIRFAX COUNTY (LST-1193).
18
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
and NEWPORT (LST-1179). A PhibRon with an embarked MEU forms an Amphibious
Ready Group (ARG).
12. The gears of command meshed as follows: USCinCCent was designated the
theater commander and the SUPPORTED unified command. USCinCPac, as one of the
SUPPORTING unified commanders, tasked his component commanders, CinCPacFlt
among them, to provide designated forces. CG FMFPac, subordinate to
CinCPacFlt, in turn ordered CG I MEF to ready the 1st and 7th MEBs for
deployment. Similarly, 4th MEB received its tasking from FMFLant which in
turn had been tasked by USCinCLant through USCinCLantFlt.
13. With the U.S. Air Force insistent on the indivisibility of air power and
the requirement for centralized operational control, and the U.S. Marine Corps
equally insistent on the integrated nature of its air-ground teams, such
doctrinal differences are inevitable, and, on balance, even have a certain
virtue.
14. Readers should prepare for a whole new lexicon of acronyms in use in
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The air-transported elements of a MAGTF are
known as the "FIE" or "fly-in-echelon."
15. All MPS ships are named for Marine Corps recipients of the Medal of
Honor. The 13 ships were divided among the three squadrons as follows: MPSRon
1: MV KOCAK (MPS-1), OBREGON (MPS-2), PLESS (MPS-3), and BOBO (MPS-4); MPSRon
2: MV HAUGE (MPS-5), BAUGH (MPS-6), ANDERSON (MPS-7), FISHER (MPS-8), and
BONNYMAN (MPS-9); MPSRon 3: MV WILLIAMS (MPS-10), LOPEZ (MPS-11), LUMMUS
(MPS-12), and BUTTON (MPS-13).
16. 7th MEB, as with the other MAGTFS, had a standing command element or
headquarters. The ground combat element, i.e., the reinforced 7th Marines;
the aviation combat element, Marine Aircraft Group 70; and the combat service
support element, Brigade Service Support Group 7; were not permanently
assigned elements of the brigade, but all were designated and all had recently
exercised with the brigade.
17. The Harrier, a unique aircraft and uniquely suited to the Marine Corps,
had proved its excellence in the Battle for the Falklands. The RAF's Harriers
may well have been the premier tactical aircraft in that well-fought little
war. The A-6 Intruder is an old-timer, nearing the end of a tong and
successful service life. Earlier models distinguished themselves in Vietnam,
primarily because of their all-weather bombing capability. The Marines also
have the EA-6B Prowler which is the electronic warfare version.
18. Transit Group 1: USS SHREVEPORT (LPD-12), TRENTON (LPD-14), PORTLAND
(LSD37), and GUNSTON HALL (LSD-44). Transit Group 2: USS NASSAU (LHA-4),
RALEIGH (LPD-1), PENSACOLA (LSD-38), and SAGINAW, (LST-1 188). Transit Group
3: USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), GUAM (LPH-9), MANITOWOC (LST-1180), and LAMOURE
COUNTY (LST-1194).
19. This relief had been planned months before Desert Shield. A division is
a major general's billet and it was a special tribute to General Myatt that he
was given the command as a brigadier. Major General John P. ("Phil") Monohan
was retiring after a distinguished 35-year career. His last assignment was as
commanding general of both I Marine Expeditionary Force and 1st Marine
Division. General Gray, who officiated at the 8 August ceremony, had decided
19
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
to divide these responsibilities between Boomer and Myatt, but at the same
time designating Boomer as Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp
Pendleton. By eliminating a three star billet in Washington, Gray was able to
promote Boomer to lieutenant general. Within a few weeks Myatt was selected
for promotion to major general.
20. As eventually constituted, the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield would
consist of three infantry regiments--the 1st, 3d, and 7th Marines; an
artillery regiment--the 11th Marines; and the following separate battalions:
1st Light Armored Infantry, 1st Combat Engineers, 1st Reconnaissance, 3d
Assault Amphibian, 1st and 3d Tanks.
21. A separate component command for the Marines avoided the ambiguity of
early Vietnam War command arrangements when ComUSMACV had a naval component
which was sometimes commanded by the CG III MAF as the senior naval officer.
22. The ships in PhibRon 5 were the USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), OGDEN (LPD-5), FORT
MCHENRY (LSD-43), CAYUGA (LST-1186), and DURHAM (LKA-114).
23. MAGTF 6-90 was embarked in the USS DUBUQUE (LPD-8), SAN BERNARDINO
(LST-1189), and SCHENECTADY (LST-1195).
24. This was reminiscent of the Korean War, when a Korean Marine Corps
regiment served under the 1st Marine Division and of the Vietnam War, when the
Korean Blue Dragon Brigade served under the operational guidance of the III
Marine Amphibious Force.
25. The JCS deployment order of 9 November 1990 did indeed specify the 11
Marine Expeditionary Force and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
26. The 13 ships of PhibGru3 were the USS TARAWA (LHA-1), NEW ORLEANS
(LPH-11), TRIPOLI (LPH-10), DENVER (LPD-9), JUNEAU (LPD-10), VANCOUVER
(LPD-2), ANCHORAGE (LSD-36), GERMANTOWN (LSD-42), MOUNT VERNON (LSD-39),
PEORIA (LST-1183), BARBOUR COUNTY (LST-1184), FREDERICK (LST-1184), and
MOBILE (LKA-115).
27. Intermittently throughout this period the East Coast-based 22d Marine
Expeditionary Unit, having returned from its deployment, was on heightened
alert, ready to respond to a possible protection of the U. S. Embassy and
evacuation-of-U.S. citizens mission in Haiti, as that Caribbean country went
through the trauma of a presidential election and post-election unrest.
28. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing for Desert Shield consisted of two fixed-wing
aircraft groups, MAGs 11 and 13; two helicopter groups, MAGs 16 and 26; Marine
Air Control Group 38; and several separate squadrons.
29. The 1st Force Service Group, reinforced, was divided into a General
Support Command, under BGen Brabham's immediate command and consisting of
three combat service support detachments; and a Direct Support Command
(essentially the 2d Force Service Command), under BGen Charles C. Krulak,
consisting of the 2d Medical Battalion, the 7th and 8th Engineer Support
Battalions. and three more combat service support detachments.
30. As organized for Desert Shield, the 2d Marine Division would include three
infantry regiments-the 4th, 6th. and 8th; an artillery regiment-the 10th
Marines;
20
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
and the following separate battalions: 2d Light Armored Infantry, 2d and 8th
Tanks, 2d Assault Amphibians, 2d Combat Engineers, and 2d Reconnaissance.
31. It was reported that on the way out, a baby was born to one of the
passengers while the CH-53E refueled in the air.
32. By 15 January some 17,000 Marine Corps Reserves had responded to the call
to active duty.
21
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Major General Hopkins commanded the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the
first significant Marine Corps force to arrive in the Persian Gulf. Before he
deployed with the brigade, he also commanded the Marine Air Ground Combat
Center in Twentynine Palms California, where Marine units go for desert and
combined arm training. When Lieutenant General Boomer arrived in Saudi
Arabia, General Hopkins became the Deputy Commander of I Marine Expeditionary
force.
In this interview, General Hopkins discusses the first operational
offload of Maritime Prepositioning Ships, and describes the measures taken by
the first American forces to arrive in Saudi Arabia to defend against the
large, menacing Iraqi Army in Kuwait.
This Was No Drill
interview with Major General John I. Hopkins, USMC
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, November 1991
PROCEEDINGS: When were you alerted?
Hopkins: The brigade was alerted officially to deploy on 8 August 1990, while
the Maritime Prepositioning Ships [MPS] got under way on the 7th, and we
started working the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). We didn't have
all the ships in the right spots. Only three were at Diego Garcia; one was at
Blount Island, Florida, on a maintenance cycle; and one was en route. So we
didn't have our total package. But the Diego Garcia ships got moving.
We worked like hell. We had a problem with the TPFDD right away because
it was due to be updated in October. This was August, it hadn't been reworked
for a couple of years, and we had some problems. Everybody wanted to put on
more gear than the 250 equivalent airlift sorties allowed. So after my staff
came to me and said, "We need a decision. They're trying to dump everything
on," I said, "If you put something additional on the aircraft, you've got to
take something off."
PROCEEDINGS: Did you take more tanks on your ships, based on what you thought
you would be up against?
Hopkins: No. We had the generic Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) equipment
package. We couldn't have changed it anyway. The MPS concept equals the
prepositioned ships plus the fly-in echelon. The flexibility is there,
though, for new weapon systems like the light armored vehicle [LAV] variants,
or new communications gear, and things that haven't been loaded on the MPS
since the last maintenance cycle; those get put on the fly-in echelon.
22
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
PROCEEDINGS: How was your intelligence support?
Hopkins: One of the failures of the whole damn war was intelligence. I think
it was terrible, absolutely terrible. Strategic intelligence, what the Air
Force was using in Iraq, that's something different. But the battlefield
intelligence was inadequate. When the battalion commanders and regimental
commanders--and I'm getting beyond my portion of it--crossed the line of
departure, they didn't know what was in front of them, and that's just
unconscionable, as far as I'm concerned.
PROCEEDINGS: You were the senior Marine commander in the area. Did you have
to do most of the liaison with the Saudis?
Hopkins: Yes. [Brigadier] General Jim Brabham had served with Central Command
on a previous tour and knew the area, so General Boomer sent him over to look
at the infrastructure. He went to Riyadh right away and really didn't have
anything to do with the 7th MEB. As soon as we got in we were hunkered down
at the port and marrying up our units with the equipment, I focused on the
tactical situation.
I conducted visual reconnaissance flights with the helicopters, and went
down to talk with Major General Saleh, who was the Saudi Eastern Province
Commander. Here we were, all these Americans coming into Saudi Arabia and we
needed some decisions: Where we could deploy; what infrastructure could we
use; where could we establish live-fire ranges. Those kinds of things.
Map of The Persian Gulf Area
23
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Rear Admiral Bader was the senior Saudi naval officer in Jubayl, and he
had a lot of influence in the local area. I would talk with him. There was a
Royal Commission of Jubayl on the civilian side of the house which controlled
most of the available infrastructure, but we had to get some camps set up to
get our Marines out of the port. Our Marines were sitting in these warehouses
in 130 degrees temperatures, with no heads or showers. The decision-making
system in Saudi Arabia took a long time to get moving. We did the best we
could in Jubayl, but the Saudis couldn't gear up fast enough. With the stench
and the heat, it was just tough. We had a good setup at the port facility,
but we had to get the troops out to the field for morale and security reasons.
Every day I would go around and see someone from the Royal Commission, or
Bader, or I'd go down and see Saleh, and then I'd get in a helicopter and I'd
go north to see how the hell we were setting up. We started to break the log
jam. We got the ranges, and we got permission to deploy. But it took a lot of
time.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you have to go immediately into defensive positions?
Hopkins: No. Like everything else, you've got to prepare the equipment and do
the reconnaissance. While the subordinate units were getting ready, my staff
was tying in with Central Command in Riyadh, and I was making liaison with the
local authorities; both civilian and military, so we could do what we needed
to do.
PROCEEDINGS: Were the Saudis defending?
Hopkins: No. They had a couple of trip-wire units deployed to the north, but
for all practical purposes the Saudis hadn't initiated any defensive plans for
the eastern province. I wanted to get a sector assigned to the Marine Corps,
get the ranges, and find out what limitations I had. For instance, they
didn't want us to put the tanks and the amtracks [AAVP-7 assault amphibians]
through the towns, because they thought we were going to damage the roads and
alarm the people. That type of thing.
The 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division was in there. We tied in with
them defensively right away.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you have liaison teams with the 82nd?
Hopkins: Yes. We talked to them daily and figured out how we were going to
defend. My mission was to defend as far forward as possible, grind down the
Iraqis if they attacked, plus defend the vital areas around Jubayl. We were
also supposed to defend Ra's Tannurah, which is to the south, but that's too
big an area. We just didn't have the force for it, even though eventually we
had 17,000 Marines in the brigade. The Army eventually picked up the mission.
24
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
PROCEEDINGS: What about the equipment coming off the ships?
Hopkins: We had no problems with the offload. The pier facilities and the
airheads were great. We started to move the AV-8Bs up to the King Abdul Aziz
Naval Air Station right in back of Jubayl so they would be responsive to the
front lines. The F/A-18s were down at Shaik Isa in Bahrain.
There were only about three or four defensible pieces of terrain between
the Kuwaiti border and Jubayl. I went up to Manifa Bay, which is about 70
miles south of the Kuwaiti border. We decided to screen there with the light
armored vehicles, and then Colonel [now Brigadier General Carlton W.] Fulford
could deploy the mechanized units and the greater part of the Regimental
Combat Team by the cement factory, which was 40 miles north of Jubayl and 27
miles or so south of Manifa Bay, where there was some relief in the desert.
It was the best defensible terrain and Fulford deployed his Regimental Combat
Team there.
That was our concept. We would screen as far forward as possible, delay
and attrit the Iraqis with air power, then defend in a main battle area along
what became known as "cement ridge." The Iraqis had two possible attack
routes. We thought they'd either come down the coast or use a route a little
bit to the west, but both these routes come together at a junction near the
cement factory. If they kept coming, we had drawn a line in the sand by the
cement factory. We were going to stay there.
PROCEEDINGS: How soon were you ready?
Hopkins: 25 August. We were alerted on 8 August. The ships got there on 16
August. We started bringing in the troops, and we probably could have been
ready a couple of days earlier if the air had gotten over sooner.
We had the attack helicopters, the Hueys, and the transports. The
helicopters were coming in by Air Force C-5s. We had them all. They were
coming in fine.
But the fixed-wing was stalled at MCAS [Marine Corps Air Station]
Beaufort and at MCAS Cherry Point. The Air Force didn't give us the tankers
that we needed to get across the Atlantic. That was my biggest concern,
because basically the concept calls for us to be combat ready in about ten
days. We were ready on the ground, with the MEB declared combat ready on 25
August; but the F/A-18s didn't arrive until around the 23rd, because they were
delayed. The Air Force was moving its own aircraft, and that's one of the
weaknesses of the MPF concept--it's not tied together at the Joint Chiefs of
Staff level. They've got to say, "Okay. The ships are gone, but you also
have tactical air-craft to deploy." The aircraft need the same priority as
the ground forces, and they didn't get it.
PROCEEDINGS: When did you first get some OV-10s, either FLIR [forward-looking
infrared radar]-capable or for tactical air coordinator (airborne) missions
and radio relay?
25
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
Hopkins: Not in August. The first OV-10s arrived in the latter part of
September. They self-deployed [via Greenland, Iceland, and down through
Europe]. The weather affected them. So they didn't come till later, and that
was a mistake.
Colonel Manfred Rietsch, who commanded Marine Aircraft Group 70, had
said, "Let's crane the OV-10s on board the T-AVBs [the aircraft maintenance
ships USNS WRIGHT (T-AVB-3) and the USNS CURTISS (T-AVB-4)]." So I talked to
General [Royal] Moore, who commanded the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and he said,
"We'll let them go out with the 5th MEB." But the 5th MEB didn't come out for
a couple more months.
If we had to do it again, we'd have to get the OV-10s over earlier. We
could see vastness of the desert from the maps, and we knew that the OV-10 was
a player. They're money in the bank. The one time you need them justifies
all you have to go through to get them there. The carrier battle groups are
always going to be around. But we've got to get the OV-10s in there. It's
tough. I don't want to belabor this, because it was a hiccup; we were still
combat ready. We used the Hueys to make up for it.
PROCEEDINGS: How did you tie in with the 82nd Airborne?
Hopkins: We had daily meetings with the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd, which was
also at Jubayl. I asked, "What are you guys going to do'?" We divided up the
pie and so forth. The 82nd was going to send their antitank [AT] teams out
there, with tanks and AT weapons in front to hit them with whatever they've
got, and then try to delay to Dammam.
PROCEEDINGS: The carriers were there early, and the Air Force F-15s came in
fairly early; what kind of liaison did you have with the carriers?
Hopkins: We didn't go directly to the carriers. We went through Central
Command and NavCent in Bahrain. Until we got our own aircraft there and we
had the self-sufficiency of the Marine air-ground task force, we were mainly
tied into the Air Force through CentAF in Riyadh. At that time, remember, the
carrier battle groups were not coming up that far north because they didn't
know what the missile and mine threats were. That evolved--they came up later
when they knew the missile threat wasn't there.
PROCEEDINGS: How would you have gotten air support if you really needed it?
Hopkins: We would have gone right to the Air Force through our liaison
officers with CentAF in Riyadh. We had our own attack helicopters, but every
day we were hoping Saddam wouldn't come down. If he had come down, it might
have been a different story in terms of the whole outcome. We would have
hunkered down right around Jubayl. Jubayl is the petrochemical capital of
Saudi Arabia. All the water that they get in Riyadh comes out of the
desalinization plants in Jubayl, so they could have theoretically cut off
Riyadh.
26
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
We were tied into all the command-and-control systems. We didn't have full
Marine air support yet, but we planned to plug in, send a mission, say, "Hey,
we need this." Central Command would have come through for us, and by 23
August Boomer was in Riyadh. I wasn't worried about getting air support.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you have any ground-based electronic warfare capability?
Hopkins: No, that was in the follow-on echelon. We didn't have radio
battalion support going in, but we did eventually get that capability.
PROCEEDINGS: Where were you getting your battlefield intelligence?
Hopkins: We relied on Central Command pushing it down to us from Riyadh.
Talking with General Saleh on a daily basis tied in the Saudi Army side of it,
and I would talk with Bader. But their intelligence was poor. We didn't
really have any intelligence except what was coming from Central Command, and
it painted an overpowering picture--we were facing 11 Iraqi divisions. But
this was from a macro-viewpoint.
Getting back to my earlier comment, intelligence was terrible. Later on
after the 7th MEB had been absorbed into I MEF, we were tracking the Iraqi
80th Tank Brigade for months. Because of the T-72 tanks, it was a major
threat--but it turned out that this unit wasn't in our sector after all. It
had left Kuwait months before and we didn't know it. The intelligence was not
accurate. They kept on building this guy to be a great fighter, great
artillery; they had barriers and mines; they're going to put oil into these
obstacles and light it off--and so forth.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you see any prisoners of war before the ground war started?
Hopkins: We never got any POWs until after the war started, and we got them
for ourselves. The Saudis had the POWs and wouldn't let us interrogate them
to get the intelligence we needed.
The Saudis picked up defectors. They took prisoners. But for the whole
six months of Desert Shield, right until we initiated the attack, the Saudis
controlled any defector who came across, and any POWS. At our level, we never
knew whether we were getting any of that information.
PROCEEDINGS: What took most of your time while you commanded the brigade?
Hopkins: Planning. Conducting liaison. Preparing the defense. How we were
to be supported? All those things you need to give the tactical commander
exactly what he requires. Making sure the operations order we had was good
tactically, that we tied in with the 82nd, that the Saudis knew exactly what
we were doing. We worked those issues day in and day out.
27
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
PROCEEDINGS: The desert has few terrain features--how did that affect you?
Hopkins: We had enough GPS gear as the operation developed. There were a few
problems with maps in terms of adequate numbers. Then, of course, when you're
along the coastline it doesn't present the problem that you would have if you
were in the middle of nowhere. We didn't want for anything logistically. We
unloaded those ships; we got the ammunition into our positions; and then we
trained as best we could. Colonel Fulford conducted combined arms training,
working the artillery and air hard.
PROCEEDINGS: But until the 25th, were you depending a great deal on air?
Hopkins: Yes. If they had come down on the 25th, of course, we would have had
a hasty defense instead of a more deliberate defense. We would have used Air
Force air, and kept on unloading the ships, getting stronger each day.
PROCEEDINGS: When did you give up the brigade as it was absorbed by I MEF?
Hopkins: Between 3 and 6 September. The 7th MEB command element and the
headquarters were absorbed by the MEF.
PROCEEDINGS: You run the Marine Corps training at Twentynine Palms in addition
to commanding the brigade. Were the troops prepared for what they went up
against? Do you plan to change any of the training?
Hopkins: With the commitments the Marine Corps has, every summer we're
rotating about one-third the outfit. We were in the middle of that when the
call came. Fulford assessed the state of training of his battalions--1/7 [1st
Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment], 2/7, 3/7, and 3/9. The MEB had been
scheduled to go to Turkey on Exercise Display Determination in September, and
I used the cover of that exercise to get moving a little bit, because even
before we were officially notified on 8 August, I thought maybe we would be
involved.
We used a little operational security to good effect. On the West Coast,
everybody said, "Hey, they're going out of the 1st Marine Division." Nobody
said anything about Twentynine Palms. So it was a good thing. We got out of
town without a lot of publicity. We set up an eight-day program--a minimum
program--and a 14-day program, because when you deploy in echelon, you don't
all go at the same time. Whatever training units needed, they got. We went
24-hours-a-day; we worked the Combined Arms Staff Trainer (CAST), command and
control, and battalion and regimental operations.
The 7th Marines were at Twentynine Palms and 3/9 was on its way up to
Canada to work with the Princess Guards. We brought them back. That was
Fulford's best-trained battalion because it had been together the longest.
28
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
PROCEEDINGS: Was 3/9 ticketed to go originally?
Hopkins: No, but we brought four battalions over. It happened that we had the
lift for four battalions instead of what we'd call a troop lift for three, so
we had four battalions. We constituted one of the battalions as a reserve,
but that came later.
Here is how it all evolved. One of the 7th's battalions--3/7--was on
unit deployment, but 1/5 had just come back from Panama, so Fulford asked for
1/5 and Major General [John P.] Monohan [then commanding the 1st Marine
Division] said, "Fine. Take 1/5." Remember, we still didn't know if 3/9 was
going to be turned around. So we had 1/7, 2/7, and 1/5. Then as we started
working the TPFDD, and because Fulford wanted to take as much as we could, he
asked Division to turn around 3/9, and we got them. So the final bag was 1/7,
2/7, 1/5, and 3/9.
We worked all the staffs in CAST. We realized we could not do a standard
combined arms exercise but we've got a mobile assault course that ties in
artillery on a company level. So we said, "Let's get everybody on the mobile
assault course that we can, tanks, amtracks, LAVs, and then we'll work the
infantry guys, zero their battle-sights, put them on the weapons ranges, and
do as much of that as we can. That's exactly what we did.
I think that was a dynamite program. I think it raised the level of
confidence and maximized the opportunity that we had. The units that were
going to flow first in the air lift went out to the field first. As the
time-phased deployment unfolded, each one of the battalions got maximum
opportunity to train before leaving.
PROCEEDINGS: People may forget now about the chemical threat because it didn't
materialize. Did you have all your gear at the time?
Hopkins: We took everything we had. The intelligence guys knew the Iraqis had
a hell of an NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] capability, so we brought
all the gas masks, all the MOPP [mission-oriented protective posture] gear.
The British gear came later. We got anything we asked for. The Marine Corps
turned to; DoD turned to: the industrial complex turned to.
PROCEEDINGS: Are you emphasizing anything different in training now that
you're back?
Hopkins: They caught us short in our mine-clearing capability, because we
hadn't worked with that. The Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
California, went to battle stations, came up with some video tapes, brought
them on over, and we worked that. But we started from ground zero in building
up, getting equipment.
29
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
PROCEEDINGS: How did your equipment hold up over there--tanks, LAVs?
Hopkins: Terrific. People ask me, "Are these kids-or the officers--any better
than they were ten years ago?" I say, "Marines are always Marines, but there
is a big difference between us and 20 years ago, and that's the weapon systems
we have. All our weapon systems worked perfectly. The only real glitch we
had was the line charges we used to blow breaching paths through the mine
fields; we had only about a 50-60 percent success rate. We just doubled up
whatever our requirement was to do that, and we had some teams come on over
and work on it. But that's basically the only thing that caused us any
problems.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you have enough night-vision capability?
Hopkins: Not initially for everyone, but enough for the forward units.
Eventually, we had plenty. That was one of the imbalances that cost the
Iraqis. It was just dynamite. With the M60, we were taking T-72s out at
3,000 meters, using our night vision stuff. We used it and optimized it.
PROCEEDINGS: Did the 7th MEB have M60 tanks on the ships?
Hopkins: Yes. A lot of people said, "How can you go up against a T-72?" Well,
take [Lieutenant Colonel Alphonso] Buster Diggs, who commanded the 3d Tank
Battalion. When this thing came down, I called him in and asked, "What do we
have to do?" He said, "The only thing we've got to do is when they come,
we've got to close with them right away and take away the advantage they have
of outgunning us. In close, we'll have more maneuverability, we'll have the
sabot round, and we'll cause some problems." And he was right, absolutely
right. During Desert Storm we were taking out the T-72s with M60s firing
sabot rounds because we got in close.
PROCEEDINGS: You've also got remotely piloted vehicles [RPVs]. Did you take
the Pioneers?
Hopkins: We had one company in the fly-in echelon of the brigade. Initially
there were some problems but then they were worked out. They did a hell of a
job. We used them for battlefield surveillance, for adjusting artillery. The
RPVs are here to stay.
PROCEEDINGS: Do you have any strong feelings about whether some of them should
stay with the division, some belong to the wing, who should own them?
Hopkins: No. That was a turf battle at first. They should either be owned by
the division, and used by the surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence
guys; and by the artillery--or the assets should be pooled under the MEF.
We've got to resolve that. The aviators wanted to control the RPVs to
preclude any chance
30
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
for midair collisions, but that's not a problem. The RPVs have to be out in
front of a tactical commander, although you could use it for rear area
security.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you have any communications problems?
Hopkins: We used multi-channel and TacSat, but don't forget, we weren't that
far out. The regiment was outside of Jubayl and we could still communicate
with the LAVs that were forward, so the distances were okay.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you use an LAV for a command post?
Hopkins: No. My command post was not that far from the units. The command
and control could still go from Jubayl.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you use commercial telephones much?
Hopkins: Absolutely. The reason for that is that whether people realize it or
not, Saudi Arabia has the best telecommunications system in the whole world.
Remember, the Iraqis weren't trying to take all that stuff out, so we used any
means available while we established redundancy in our communication. Then as
the units kept on flowing in, we got more communications gear, and it worked
out.
PROCEEDINGS: Did the troops initially stay in the lines for a long time before
anybody got to stand down?
Hopkins: Yes, they did, but their adrenalin was pumping--later on it was
motivation that kept them going. We moved right to the field. General Boomer
made a conscious decision that we would not have any built-up areas like those
we had in Vietnam. We were going bare-boned. You put a camouflage net over
somebody and it drops the temperature about ten degrees. We had to get them
acclimatized as soon as we could, and the only way to do that was to put them
in the field. Three or four weeks after we got there, they'd be down to their
tee-shirts. These Marines really looked good. Then we just started training,
training, and more training. Eventually we set up a rotation system from the
field to Jubayl for some rest and relaxation.
PROCEEDINGS: Did individual weapons hold up in the sand?
Hopkins: Absolutely. We were cleaning the weapons twice, three times a day.
Sand storms would come up and the Marines would be doubly careful. But we
didn't have any problems like the ones we had in Vietnam, many of which were
caused by improper care.
31
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
PROCEEDINGS: How did the LAVs hold up?
Hopkins: Remember that the Marine Corps and the Army went together on the LAV
and then they left us. This is General [Alfred M.] Gray's initiative. One of
the things in combined arms, and one of the things in the desert, is mobility.
You can't walk. You've got to have mobility. The LAV is a dynamic weapon,
and that includes the TOW and mortar variants. The 25-mm chain gun was
deadly. The LAV held up. It could go 30-40 miles per hour across the desert
floor. We used it when we were determining where we were going to breach and
before G-Day, we used the LAV to run up and down the border of Kuwait to
confuse the Iraqis on where our penetration was going.
PROCEEDINGS: Are you referring here to deception operations such as Troy?
Hopkins: Yes. [Brigadier General] Tom Draude ran that, and the LAV was a big
player. The tires held up, everything worked.
PROCEEDINGS: Did you have any tank transporters?
Hopkins: No, our tanks went on their own tracks, or we got host-nation
support. We did do that. Or you borrow them from the Army, once they are
established.
PROCEEDINGS: What is the 7th MEB story?
Hopkins: I'm very proud of what happened. Since the Iran affair with the
hostages, a lot of people in the Carter administration, the Marine Corps, and
the Navy, invested in the MPS concept; it went like clockwork. We were the
only service that had any initial sustainability. We could have fought on 25
August and sustained ourselves, but everyone else had to wait about six months
for the buildup.
The Army moved all its combat service support into the reserves. In
contrast, we were feeding hot meals in the mess hall within 16 days, before
the MEF arrived. We had kept our field messes, had brought them with us, and
had the capability to serve cooked Bravo [canned] rations augmented by some
fresh food that came in from the infrastructure.
The secret of the MPS concept, of course, is exercises. When I came
aboard in 1989, a year before, we took four ships and went to Exercise Thalay
Thai. I had the same Colonel Powell who commanded the Brigade Service Support
Group; I had Colonel Fulford with the ground combat arm. The only officer I
didn't have was the MAG-70 commander, Colonel Fratarangelo, who was
transferred to Central Command; Colonel Rietsch took his place.
At Thalay Thai my staff and those commanders did a two-ship offload in a
worst-case basis--6,000 meters off the beach--by ferrying everything. People
knew each other, and they knew me.
32
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
The secret is employment. Predeployment or deployment, we're going to
get there--but then some people lose track. The real question is what are you
going to do when you get there? Are you going to be combat effective? Do you
know how to do these things? I've always tried for balance. The deployment
mode is important. We've got to meet Transportation Command's requirements.
But what we get paid for by the American people, Congress, the Commander-in-
Chief, and the JCS, is employment. That's always my thing.
I believe that a lack of human intelligence regarding Iraq and its
capabilities, (remember that Humint [human intelligence] was drastically cut
at the national level in the 1970s), put us at the mercy of the National
systems. These photographic systems can't tell you enemy intentions, although
they can do other things well. The intelligence information flow was
terrible. We had to send guys back to Washington to get photos three days
before we went into the minefields.
We got terrific cooperation from the Saudis. In any kind of operation
like this, you're going to have to spend a lot of time with the host country.
in this case, the host country is very sophisticated and you're the outsider,
just walking in there. You have to do the right thing. It all worked out.
33
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
By the end of the ground war, over 90 percent of the Fleet Marine Force was in
the Persian Gulf. In less than six months, Marine logisticians created an
infrastructure that supported over 90,000 Marines, a larger Marine force than
that present in Vietnam at the height of that conflict. Brigadier General
Brabham commanded the 1st Force Service Support Group, the senior Marine
logistical headquarters in the Persian Gulf. In this interview he describes
the efforts of the Marines in his command both in preparation for and during
the war.
Training, Education Were the Keys
interview with Brigadier General James A. Brabham, USMC
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, November 1991
PROCEEDINGS: Let's go at it chronologically. Where were you when you got your
warning order about deploying to the Gulf? And how did you go about setting up
an FSSG-sized operation in Saudi Arabia?
Brabham: The initial warning came very quickly after the Iraqi assault into
Kuwait, which began on 2 August. Lieutenant General [Walter E.] Boomer, then
in process of taking command of I MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] at Camp
Pendleton, California, began holding meetings with his subordinate commanders.
It soon became evident that out first move would be to establish a presence in
the Central Command headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as CentCom's Marine
Corps component--MarCent. Since I had served earlier on the CentCom staff,
General Boomer dispatched me to Riyadh on 10 August--not as an FSSG commander
but as his personal representative, in charge of MarCent (Forward). My first
task was to become involved in the initial planning for introduction of forces
into Saudi Arabia--which involved real estate, transportation, and other
things to be sorted out at the CinC's level. I took along a few Marines--
technical experts--directly to Riyadh, and checked in with the senior
representative of the Central Command, Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, who
also served as the commander of CentCom's Air Force forces, or CentAF. Many
of the CinC's staff, including the J-4 [logistics officer], Major General Dane
Starling, U.S. Army, had already deployed to Riyadh.
Besides setting up MarCent (Forward), I had to work with the CinC's staff to
prepare for the early introduction of the 7th MEB Marine Expeditionary
Brigade], and to establish a direct link back to General Boomer at Camp
Pendleton, California, to keep him posted in near-real time about the
situation developing in the Gulf region.
34
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Within days, Major General [John I.] Hopkins had brought the 7th MEB into
the theater, and was deploying his forces in their initial operating area near
[the port of] Al Jubayl. I stayed in close contact with him to ensure that
his immediate needs were being met by the CentCom staff. The inevitable
problems in coordinating with the host nation were best solved at the CinC
level, so that was another key task for me in Riyadh.
About one month later--6 September, as I recall--we had enough combat
service support personnel in country to stand up the headquarters of the 1st
FSSG at Al Jubayl. It was a composite unit, consisting largely of BSSG-7
[Brigade Service Support Group-7, supporting the 7th MEB]; the smaller BSSG-1,
from Hawaii; and some of my own 1st FSSG people from Camp Pendleton. At the
time I moved my flag from Riyadh to Al Jubayl, our composite unit was roughly
half the size of a full-fledged FSSG. (See map on page 23)
PROCEEDINGS: These brigade service support groups had a lot of experience in
MPS [maritime prepositioning ships] deployments, didn't they?
Brabham: Absolutely. This first combat MPS deployment [where Marines are
flown into a crisis area to "marry up" with heavy equipment and supplies
carried by ships of MPS squadrons) had been well-rehearsed, and it went very,
very well. There was some hurry-up pressure to get Marines out to their
defensive positions, in light of the Iraqi threat--and we had to get used to
working in the heat and sand and other complicating factors--but we got a
great assist from the fact that we had exclusive use of the large, modern port
of Al Jubayl. It is a 16-berth port with full facilities, and it even had an
indigenous work force in place, ready to assist.
PROCEEDINGS: Who coordinated that stevedore effort?
Brabham: Initially, General Hopkins coordinated the offload of the 7th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, and the follow-on 1st MEB handled their own unloading.
Once my force service support group was in place, however, we picked up
responsibility for the total port operation, including native workers and U.S.
Army units.
PROCEEDINGS: That's got to be a Marine Corps first!
Brabham: I guess it probably was. But it was a cooperative effort, under 1st
FSSG guidance. We had a naval support element that came with the MPS
squadrons and became the Navy's cargo-handling group. Those sailors worked
alongside the Marine Landing Support Battalion. Eventually, we added an Army
cargo-handling group, the 10th Transportation Battalion, which handled some
Marine shipping as well as Army shipping. Everyone cooperated, and it didn't
matter who unloaded what. We just worked against the priorities of the port,
and things turned out rather well.
35
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
PROCEEDINGS: Who handled initial construction?
Brabham: All of the general-support engineering came through the combined
efforts of two Marine engineer battalions and one SeaBee regiment. The
primary engineering effort was to improve the existing airfields in the
region. The Saudi airfields had tremendous runways, but they were lacking in
aprons and parking areas and those sorts of ancillary facilities. So we had a
major Navy-Marine Corps construction effort under way, to make the airfields
fully capable of supporting tactical operations. We couldn't spend much time
building living or working spaces for the first couple of months, so units in
the field had to rely on tentage--but living under canvas worked out okay,
even though it was hot.
PROCEEDINGS: Other than offloading and getting the air-fields in shape, what
were your major concerns? Any shortages?
Brabham: None to speak of. We were able to validate the MPS concept by
providing 30-plus days of material and supplies. We were fortunate, in that
the Saudi Arabian infrastructure is pretty good, even though it is
concentrated along the coast. The Saudis were able to assist us initially
with an abundant supply of fuel, some water, and even some basic ration
support--helping to solve our first major problems. After that, our priority
was to get our Marine forces deployed to their defensive positions in the
desert, then to establish immediate resupply processes to keep them in water,
fuel, and--of course--ammunition.
Most of our efforts from the beginning concentrated on unloading,
hauling, and laying down ammunition in basic stowage facilities in the desert.
In fact, ammunition remained the logistical driving factor throughout the
entire operation. A 30-day supply of ammunition for a Marine division adds up
to about 265,000 tons. Try to imagine stacking, moving, and storing that
amount of ammo, and you'll get some idea of the strain it placed on our
transportation system.
PROCEEDINGS: As more and more Marines arrived in country, did you spread your
support operations out from Al Jubayl?
Brabham: Our initial defensive perimeter was some 30 miles away from the port,
out in the desert. Within weeks, as we developed our defense-in-depth, we had
forces operating 80 miles out from the port, in areas with absolutely no
supporting infrastructure. Here we were, still in the defensive--Desert
Shield--part of the operation, and we were already required to provide support
over terrain and distances that Marines don't normally think about. Our
immediate response was to establish several forward-based combat service
support detachments, capable of providing all classes of supply to the
forwardmost units.
36
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I decided early on that the highly centralized command-and-control aspects
of the FSSG would not work well over such distances, and that the proper
solution was to break the organization into two groups--one for general
support, and the other for direct support of tactical units. I built a small,
streamlined staff (with a colonel in charge) for each group. This setup left
the FSSG headquarters and me free to deal with the host nation and the other
services, while exerting overall supervision over the two groups. Aviation
support, among other things, fell to the general support group, except for
those aviation elements deployed far forward with the ground forces. The
direct support group commander--Colonel Alex Powell--had entered the theater
of operations in command of Brigade Service Support Group-7. He took his
BSSG-7 staff and shifted his focus to direct support of the ground forces,
collocating his headquarters with that of Major General [J. M.] Mike Myatt,
commanding the 1st Marine Division. Even though Colonel Powell was one of my
subordinate commanders, he became General Myatt's advocate for resources and
mobility--one of the keys to our success in operating over such great
distances.
Before the 2d Marine Division arrived in-country in its reinforcing role,
I had a phone conversation with Brigadier General [C.C.] Chuck Krulak,
commanding the 2d FSSG. We agreed to continue the general support/direct
support arrangement. My 1st FSSG headquarters would remain the overall
logistics coordination agency, in a general support role. The 2d FSSG would
run the forward logistics battle. At the height of the Desert Storm ground
action, our supply lines were stretched more than 250 miles from Al Jubayl. I
don't know how we could have succeeded without General Krulak and his FSSG in
the direct support role, supplying the ammo, fuel, and water--the biggest
logistical drivers of combat operations.
PROCEEDINGS: By the time the ground attack got under way, we had the
equivalent of another Marine Expeditionary Force afloat off Kuwait, poised for
a major amphibious assault. Did you have plans to support such an amphibious
operation, if required?
Brabham: We sure did. From the day they first appeared in the Gulf, our
amphibious forces received continuous support from our FSSG in Saudi Arabia.
For example, we brought tanks from the amphibious forces to Al Jubayl,
performed required maintenance on them, and sent them back to the ships. We
provided secondary depots for Major General Harry Jenkins, the Commanding
General, 4th MEB, in Oman or wherever he needed them.
Had there been an amphibious assault, the real logistical drivers would
have been--once again--ammo, fuel, and water. We had a coordinated plan to
support the amphibious forces along the lines already established: the 1st
FSSG would pick up general support responsibilities and General Jenkins's own
combat service support forces would become his direct support element in
country. I had a lot of meetings with Colonel Jim Doyle, the embarked brigade
service support group commander, and we were wired together pretty tightly.
37
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
PROCEEDINGS: Getting into Desert Storm itself--were you amazed by the
swiftness of the victory? You must have had worst-case plans for a longer
period, with more casualties.
Brabham: Yes, we were pleasantly surprised. I was always concerned about its
turning into a real slugfest, and it had great potential to do just that. We
could never discount the massive amounts of arms and material the Iraqis had
in Kuwait. What we didn't know for certain was the strength of their will to
fight. That's almost impossible to tell until the fight begins.
General Krulak and I decided that we needed a substantial surge
capability to carry our committed ground forces through any period of heavy
fighting--again, the drivers were ammo, fuel, and water. We planned to
position ten days' worth of all classes of supply right up front with General
Krulak, and in one intensive two-week period we managed to move all that gear
up to a newly constructed combat service support area, way out in the middle
of the desert, where it could best support the barrier and minefield breaching
plans of the two Marine divisions. General Krulak called it "Al Khanjar"-the
dagger.
We set a goal of staging ten days' worth of supplies and equipment at Al
Khanjar, and General Boomer agreed. Then we began a most intense buildup
period, which used every imaginable means of transport. In addition to our
normal load-haulers, we used tactical vehicles--the logistics vehicle system
["Dragon Wagon"] vehicles, in particular. We even leased commercial
tractor-trailers. At one point, I had more than 1,000 40-ton tractor-trailers
leased from throughout the Gulf, as well as Saudi Arabia. Reserve motor
transport Marines drove them, for the most part.
We got tremendous support from the Air Force C-130 transport pilots, who
flew virtually every mission we requested. Chuck Krulak built an
expeditionary airstrip for them at the forward combat service support area,
and we augmented the C-130 hops with extensive use of Marine CH-53 heavy-lift
helicopters. We even used Army boats--in particular, their large LCU-2000
landing craft and logistic support vessels--to ferry material up the Gulf
coast to Ras al Mish'ab. From there, it was a relatively short leg by
helicopter and truck to the forward support area. At the same time, we were
establishing an extensive medical network--a casualty-handling chain between
the forward base, the fleet hospitals, and the evacuation airfields. All in
all, it took an incredible two weeks of effort to prepare that forward staging
base for the two-division attack through the minefields. We really loaded it
up--to ensure that we would have staying power if a slugfest started right
away. Chuck Krulak can give you some more details. He built the thing and we
just tried to keep him supplied-no small task for either of us.
PROCEEDINGS: With many combat units widely dispersed across the desert, and
the potential for mass casualties ever present, you obviously couldn't
replicate the Vietnam medical evacuation system of relying extensively on
dustoff helicopters to get the wounded to medical battalion hospitals far in
the rear . . .
38
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brabham: We had two medical battalions and their hospitals staged far forward
with General Krulak, and at least one company from each battalion was
mobile-loaded, so its field hospital could move with the ground units and set
up rapidly even farther forward, if that were required. A lot of careful
planning and hard work went into the mobile-loading of those hospitals. The
blood-replacement system, for example, was in good shape. The blood was on
hand and it was kept fresh. It is correct that we would have had to rely on
ground transport for casualties, and we had leased at least 60 buses from
Saudi sources. We took out the seats and built in racks to hold litters. The
buses were staged and ready to go.
Navy medicine really came through in this operation. They got their gear
there, and their doctors and corpsmen, and they were ready for anything. They
have things to improve as we all do, but they were a success story all the
way. My hat is off to them.
PROCEEDINGS: Desert Storm had to be one of the few times since World War I
that Marines faced the threat of mass casualties from chemical or biological
weapons. What additional burden did this place on you or the medical chain?
Brabham: My biggest concern was water. Sourcing was not a problem--you can
always find sources of water--but water hauling and distribution were always a
concern, because most of our water was coming all the way from the Gulf coast.
We had some possible sources in Kuwait, once the attack began, but we couldn't
be sure of them until we could actually walk the ground. Now, if you add the
demands of decontamination of Marines and equipment to an already difficult
problem, you must start thinking of reallocating transportation assets to
bring forward enough water. At that point water--not ammunition--would have
become the primary driver of the logistical effort.
PROCEEDINGS: Desert Storm highlighted the issue of women in combat once again.
As I recall, women are well-represented in the combat service support units--
from supply clerks to heavy-equipment operators--and they were certainly
exposed to many of the stresses and dangers of combat in the events you have
outlined. Were there any problems in the deployability or performance of the
female Marines?
Brabham: Absolutely no problems--I say that unequivocally. They did their
jobs, performed them well, and posed no special considerations in the FSSG.
We simply did not worry about them. They did fine.
39
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
PROCEEDINGS: With the speedy resolution of the ground war, you had to shift
gears rather quickly, to begin bringing all that material back home and
putting it back into shape. What special challenges did you face during the
equipment-retrograde phase of the operation?
Brabham: The logistical driving factor during retrograde was to reconstitute
our maritime prepositioning ships program with prewar loads in those floating
storehouses, restoring that vital rapid-response capability to the nation as
soon as possible. At the same time, we were trying to get our forces back
home and get their equipment cleaned up, to restore their readiness to deploy
on short notice. It was truly a Marine Corps-wide effort, assisted by
Headquarters Marine Corps, Quantico. Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific
headquarters, and the logistics bases at Albany, Georgia, and Barstow,
California.
Such a massive relocation of forces and equipment takes a while, even
under the best conditions. We had to support the pullout of the 1st Marine
Division and at the same time keep a 250-mile supply line open to the 2d
Marine Division, which would come out months later. We probably were
stretched as much during that critical early phase of redeployment as we were
at any other time, trying to do everything at once.
But the equipment is now back, and it's ready to go, although residual
cleanup efforts continue. Training has resumed at our bases, and we have no
significant holes in our readiness or our capability to deploy again, when
called. When you consider the hard, round-the-clock use that much of the
equipment got for eight months, including combat, that's pretty phenomenal.
And there are a lot of wonderful people out there in the logistics system who
made that happen.
PROCEEDINGS: Is there any question I haven't asked that you would like to
answer?
Brabham: The question I'm asked most frequently is, "What was the key to our
logistic success in Desert Storm?" That's a complex question, but I have a
rather simple answer: It's the educational level of our enlisted Marines and
their officers in our Corps today. And I say that because the key to being
able to do what we did in the Gulf is the flexibility of the Marines involved.
The way to meet those huge logistical demands is to flow your resources to the
focus of effort--the highest priority need at the time. This requires
flexibility, in the form of intelligent, well-trained Marines who can be
retrained on the spot and shift from one skill to another to meet the next
week's demand. Today's Marines can adjust that way, and they can make
decisions on their own to accomplish their missions, even though they may be
250 miles away from their bosses. In my view, that kind of flexibility goes
straight back to education.
PROCEEDINGS: As the new head of education and training at Quantico, you now
have a chance to put that theory into practice.
Brabham: I sure do.
40
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
In these articles Henry Allen, himself a former Marine, writing for THE
WASHINGTON POST, captures the outlook and idiosyncracies of the frontline
Marine. The first article describes the most self reliant of all modern
warriors, the sniper. In the second article, Allen shows how Marines, having
spent months in the desert away from their families, and with the prospect of
war looming, celebrated Christmas.
Squinting at Death: The Desert Snipers.
by Henry Allen
THE WASHINGTON POST, 28 December 1990.
Of course, when you are a sniper there is shooting.
In the Marine Corps this shooting is done with a custom-made 14-pound
.308-caliber rifle with a glass-bedded bull barrel, a Remington action and a
10-power Unertl telescopic sight. It has a bolt that doesn't so much load the
bullet as insinuate it into the chamber to be fired, a kind of smug
perfection. It has the heft of one single piece of metal, like an ingot.
You ask if you can lift it to your shoulder and look through the sights.
A circle of Saudi Arabian desert reels in the lens, with a bit of scrub
hovering there in magnified silence. There is something about it that is
intimate and unreal at the same time, as if you were aiming at a thought
inside your own mind.
"The first impression people get when you tell them you're a sniper is
you're the guy in the tree," says Sgt. Dave Cornett as he puts the rifle,
called an M40A1, back in a sealed and cushioned carrying case. But you'd
never shoot from a tree."
On the other hand, there are all those stories your Uncle Louie told
about Japanese snipers in palm trees, and there is the ongoing concept of man
as the murdering ape, too, so the tree thing lingers. Trees do not figure in
this theater. Snipers will be lucky to find a dune, a bit of scrub, maybe one
of the little trash piles left by the Bedouins.
Snipers are among the last warriors in the Western world who choose their
enemies and not only kill them but see them die.
This is not fashionable, nowadays, as Vietnam veterans learned when they
were asked, with triumphal snickers: "Did you kill anybody?"
Sgt. Alvin York was a great American legend of World War I for his
sniping. You shoot Germans like turkeys, he said, you start at the back of
the column and work up. But ever since bureaucrats and intellectuals started
doing most of the talking about war after World War II, this kind of killing
has come
Copyright 1990 THE WASHINGTON POST. Reprinted With Permission
41
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
to seem vulgar, even psychopathic, a coarse necessity best ignored if you want
to enjoy the benefits of it, like the making, as they say, of sausage.
It is more modern to press a button and annihilate scores, hundreds,
thousands, whatever, with systems, capabilities, all of the euphemisms for the
mass-production sniping that is war in the age of progress and technology.
As Jean Cocteau said of World War II, the plural has triumphed over the
singular, a tendency Dylan Thomas deplored when he insisted in a poem about an
air raid that "after the first death there is no other."
Sniping, the shooting part at least, is about first deaths. Snipers
prefer to talk about the other parts. They have learned to do it in precisely
the language that bureaucratic intellectuals approve of.
"People don't understand sniping," says Staff Sgt. Mike Barrett. "We're
the most misunderstood people in the world. Our primary mission is
intelligence, indexing targets, establishing disposition and composition of
the enemy, surveillance and target acquisition, determining what's viable and
what's not." Indexing. Disposition. Viable.
"We are the eyes and ears of the commanding officer. We carry cameras.
We have to be able to draw, do panoramic perspective drawing of what we see.
You have to be able to make it by yourselves out there, you and your partner.
You carry one meal a day, I never take a sleeping bag, I don't believe in
creature comforts. The more creature comforts you have, the less edge you
have, and I'm not about losing the edge. If it gets cold, my partner and I,
we hot-rack it, you roll up together inside a poncho liner, like you would
with your wife."
Of course, there is the shooting too. Sometimes you might use the range
of these rifles, well over 1,000 meters, to take out a radar installation.
Sometimes, you might kill someone.
There is no fancy language for this part, it seems.
The sniper puts the rifle on his shoulder and his partner studies the
target through a spotting scope, calculates the range, estimates how much to
allow for crosswind by studying heat waves twitching out there.
The sniper takes a breath, lets half of it out and fires. It can take a
full second for the bullet to get there.
"Your spotter is looking through the scope," Barrett says. "He sees the
guy's head explode. Vapor."
42
ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Saudi Christmas: the Marines Banter and Brave the Cold
by Henry Allen
THE WASHINGTON POST, 26 December 1990.
Shining in the east, far beyond First Battalion, Fifth Marines, were a
couple of flares from gas burning over oil wells, the closest thing the
Marines would see to Christmas lights.
The Marines had gotten here in August, back when the temperature was 130
degrees and everyone was saying they'd be home for Christmas.
Now it was 40 degrees. It was midnight on Christmas Eve. This is an old
story, and against the gas flares you could see the outlines of Lance Cpl.
Steven Shalno and a buddy sitting on five-gallon water cans having an old
argument to go along with it, one of the older arguments in the history of the
world.
"I am from Boston, Massachusetts," Shalno said very slowly, "and I am
behind George Bush, my commander in chief, 110 percent."
"I am half Indian," said his buddy, not quite as slowly. "And I say it
is cold . . . out here. This whole thing out here, you've got to be kidding."
"I am from Boston, Massachusetts," Shalno kept saying, "and I am a devil
dog."
"Devil dog" is what the Germans called Marines in World War I. The
Marines know their history. It seems like half the corps also has read all of
the novels about Casca, the eternal mercenary, who pulled the duty of nailing
Christ to the Cross and was doomed, the Marines will tell you, to spend
eternity as a soldier, a career that can lead to billets like sitting on
five-gallon water cans in the cold desert wind on Christmas Eve in Saudi
Arabia.
After a while, they went back into their hooch, a bunch of canvas cots
under camouflage netting. The wind blew through the netting. Men snored and
talked in their sleep--they dream a lot out here in the desert, they say. You
could see the stars through the netting. Jittery smears.
For a long time Shalno stood outside the hooch and stared at the cot of a
stranger to the platoon, stared and stared until the stranger decided to move
and show he was awake.
"You warm enough?" Shalno asked. "You look cold, man. I'll give you my
poncho liner."
Copyright 1990 THE WASHINGTON POST. Reprinted With Permission
43
U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991
"Merry Christmas," the stranger said. "Merry Christmas," Shalno said.
Then he curled up on his own cot, no poncho liner, didn't even get into his
sleeping bag, and fell instantly asleep.
In the morning, the flares had turned to black smoke over the horizon and
it was Christmas Day.
The Marines had a Christmas tree made out of netting, toilet paper,
plastic plates, a cardboard star and some tinsel streamers that had come in
all the Christmas mail, tons of it, the whole country sending presents to
these guys.
A truck full of carolers labored through the sand from company to
company, and Marines sang along with them in a tight, quiet way.
"Anybody tells you morale is high, they're a damn liar," said Pfc. Joseph
Queen, who grew up in Northwest Washington. Then he went back to insulting
fellow radio man, Lance Cpl. Erik Holt, a Nez Perce Indian who was disputing
Queen's taste in athletic teams.
"Celtics," said Queen. "Chief, you must be drinking that Indian water
again."
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