Herbicide sortie over the forests of Southeast Asia.

  Concern over the long-term effects on human health of exposure to herbicides lingered and reappeared. A Chicago television station aired a report on March 22, 1978, that alleged that 41 Vietnam veterans living in the Midwest were suffering from Agent Orange exposure. A Veterans Administration benefits counselor suggested this causal link because of the similarities in the backgrounds of veterans with medical problems that she had seen. The complaints of this group included diminished sex drives, psychological problems, numbness, and skin rashes.57

In the years following, the effects of herbicides on Vietnam veterans have been the subject of much scientific and political attention. Research focused in part on possible problems caused by dioxin, a byproduct produced in the manufacturing process of 2,4,5-T that had been present in the parts-per-million range in Agent Orange.58 The health of 1,200 Ranch Hand veterans who had the most extensive exposure to herbicides of any group of Americans who served in Southeast Asia has been extensively studied.59 As of 1996, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that there is positive evidence of association (but not necessarily causation) between herbicide exposure and soft-tissue sarcoma, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, Hodgkin’s disease, and chloracne. They have also found a limited or suggestive association between herbicides and seven other categories of disease, and further research will continue at least through 2004.60

To place events in context, the military employment of herbicides in Southeast Asia should be compared with civilian uses of the same substances. One illustrative statistic is that in the United States alone, between the years 1966 and 1969, 7,939,000 acres were treated with 2,4,5-T, the herbicide whose dioxin contaminant has caused many health concerns.61 This compares with the six million acres sprayed with all herbicides by Ranch Hand during its entire history from 1962-1971. The domestic use of 2,4,5-T was for agricultural purposes, on lawns and turf, along rights-of-way, on private forests, to kill aquatic plants, and for other purposes. There are probably few people who lived in the United States or other developed countries during the 1960s who escaped exposure to 2,4,5-T and other herbicides sprayed in Vietnam.

Honeysuckle vines were a constant problem on our woven wire fences in Tennessee. Before the general availability of herbicides, the only way to remove these vines and keep them from weighting down and destroying the fences was to laboriously hack them away. In the early 1960s, my father discovered that a simple hand sprayer and herbicide would kill honeysuckle. Some years ago I asked him what he had sprayed on the fences all those years and he directed me to a bottle in the garage. The label listed the active ingredients as an equal mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, precisely the same as Agent Orange.62 It may be that many rural families in the United States had more cumulative exposure to "Agent Orange" than a typical U.S. soldier did in Vietnam.

The consequences of Ranch Hand's work on ecology and human health have received a great deal of attention, but anyone studying this operation must also look at the military impact of herbicides. Except for the very earliest evaluations,63 assessments of the military utility of herbicides were consistently positive. The Army's Engineer Strategic Study Group surveyed U.S. military officers who had served in Vietnam and released a report in 1972 concluding that combat operations would have been considerably more difficult without herbicides. The main military benefits had been increasing visibility from both the air and the ground and assisting in the defense of fixed bases. Crop destruction's main impact had been to force the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese to modify their operations.64 The military with few exceptions viewed Ranch Hand and the herbicides they sprayed as very valuable, and a big contributor toward saving American lives.

One approach to understanding Ranch Hand's role in the Vietnam War is to view herbicides as part of a larger American effort to bring technology to bear in the solution of a problem. Herbicides were part of a war effort that whenever possible substituted firepower and other manifestations of wealth and applied science for manpower, especially American manpower. As a substitute for herbicides, more combat troops on the ground would have denied the enemy the use of certain areas. More soldiers could have secured roads and other lines of communications against ambushes and interdiction. More numerous patrols and additional outposts to extend control in contested areas would have burdened the Viet Cong at least as much as did crop destruction. However, any of these substitutes, at least while Americans were heavily involved in ground operations, would have cost more in American lives, the most precious and politically costly resource available to U.S. military commanders and political leaders. Herbicides were an important part of the U.S. approach to the war that emphasized a remote, technological means of fighting whenever possible to reduce American casualties.

Finally, the changing nature of the times from 1962, when Ranch Hand began, to 1971, when it ended, and on to today, is a very important factor. Rachel Carson has been honored with a U.S. postage stamp, but the ecological ideas she expressed in Silent Spring in 1961 were not widespread when President Kennedy made the decisions that began and expanded the herbicide program in Vietnam. Then, the United States was in the era of "better living through chemistry." Later, it became common to question the safety and environmental impact of almost every substance, from air to rain water. This changing perception in American society of the products of technology made it much easier to perceive herbicides as dangerous and perhaps immoral. Opponents of the Vietnam War were then able to use this issue as a wedge in their broader attack on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. 

Perhaps the overall lesson to be drawn from the history of Operation Ranch Hand is that unconventional weapons and tactics can have unanticipated and unconventional effects in both the physical and political environments.

  ENDNOTES

Author's Note on Sources:  Most of the documents cited in these endnotes were declassified and released to the parties in the Agent Orange litigation in the early 1980's.  I do not know if or where they are available to the public today.  If anyone knows how researchers can gain access to these documents, please inform me and I will post the information here.

1. A previous version of this paper appeared in Air University Review, Vol. 34, No. 5 (July-August 1983), pp 42-53.  For a detailed history, see the author's book, Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982). Operation Ranch Hand is out of print, but it can be found in some libraries, especially Federal Depository Libraries.  The online bookstore amazon.com claims they may be able to locate a used copy.

2. Report, Capt. Alvin L. Young, et al., USAF Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory, subject: The Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk of Herbicide Orange and Its Associated Dioxin, Oct. 1978, p. I-10 (hereafter cited as USAF OEHL Report).

3. Ibid., p. I-12.

4. 2,4-D is an active ingredient in many common lawn weed killers even today.

5. Floyd M. Ashton and Alden S. Crafts, Mode of Action of Herbicides, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 147-160, 266-288, 413-418.

6. Report, Army Air Forces Board, Orlando, FL, "Marking and Defoliation of Tropical Vegetation," Dec. 18, 1944.

7. Royal Air Force, The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, (London: Ministry of Defence, June 1970), pp. 113-114, 152.

8. Report, Wright Air Development Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, subject: Engineering Study on a Large Capacity Spray System Installation for Aircraft, June 3, 1952.

9. Report, Dr. James W. Brown, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, subject: Vegetational Spray Tests in South Vietnam, Supplement, April 1962, pp. 21-31.

10. Memo, Walt W. Rostow to the President, April 12, 1961.

11. JCS 2343/3, Status Report on the Presidential Program for Vietnam as of July 10, 1961, July 21, 1961.

12. Report, Dr. J.W. Brown, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick, MD, subject: Vegetational Spray Tests in South Vietnam, April 1962, pp. 39-45.

13. Memo, Deputy SECDEF to the President, subject: Defoliation Operations in Vietnam, Nov. 21, 1961.

14. Memo, SECSTATE to the President, subject: Defoliant Operations in Vietnam, Nov. 24, 1961.

15. NSAM 115, subject: Defoliant Operations in Vietnam, Nov. 30, 1961.

16. Message, Department of State to AMEMBASSY Saigon, Joint State-Defense Message No. 561, Nov. 30, 1962.

17. Record, 4th SECDEF Conference, HQ CINCPAC, March 21, 1962.

18. Memo, SECDEF to the President, subject: Chemical Crop Destruction, South Vietnam, Aug. 8, 1962.

19. Letter, Roger Hilsman to W. Averell Harriman, subject: Crop Destruction in South Vietnam, Aug. 24, 1962.

20. Letter, W. Averell Harriman to Roswell L. Gilpatric, Sept. 6, 1962.

21. Memo, Michael V. Forrestal to W. Averell Harriman, Oct. 3, 1962.

22. Report, MACJ325 to Asst CSAF, J-3, subject: Herbicide Program in RVN, Dec. 18, 1964; info brief, Lt Col Paul C. Callan, CBR/N Ops, Apr. 6, 1965, cited in Lazlo Hadik, et al., Constraints on the Uses of Weapons and Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Institute for Defense Analyses, Report R-117, June 1966, p. 41.

23. Message, SECSTATE to AMEMBASSY Vientiane, Joint State-Defense Message, 250130Z Nov 65, cited in Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Tiger Hound, Sept. 6, 1966, pp. 7-8.

24. Message, JCS to CINCPAC, subject: Crop Destruction, 261640Z Jul 66.

25. DJSM-196-67, Defoliation Operations in the DMZ and NVN, Jan. 13, 1967; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia, July 1961-June 1967, Oct. 11, 1967, pp. 28-29; Message, SECSTATE to AMEMBASSY Saigon, subject: Defoliation Operations, 121808Z Jun 67; Message, State #22808, 172309Z Aug 67.

26. Memo, Department of State Legal Adviser, subject: Proposed Q&A's for Hearings on the Geneva Protocol, Jan. 21, 1971.

27. Memo, SECDEF to the President, subject: Defoliant Operations in Vietnam, Feb. 2, 1962.

28. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 6, 1963, as reprinted in Congressional Record-Senate, March 4, 1963, p. 3458.

29. Letter, Robert W. Kastenmeier to President John F. Kennedy, March 7, 1963.

30. Letter, William P. Bundy to Robert W. Kastenmeier, March 16, 1963.

31. Fact Sheet, subject: Washington Post Report of Defoliation Damage at Cha La Outpost An Xuyen Province, HQ MACV, May 31, 1964, Annex B.

32. Washington Post, May 27, 1964.

33. Messages, COMUSMACV to JCS, subject: Jim Lucas Story on Defoliation of Friendly Area, 280421Z May 64 and 031238Z Jun 64.

34. Report, Anthony J. Russo, A Statistical Analysis of the U.S. Crop Spraying Program in South Vietnam, (RM-5450-ISA/ARPA), Oct. 1967; Report, Russell Betts and Frank Denton, An Evaluation of Chemical Crop Destruction in Vietnam, (RM-5446-ISA/ARPA), October 1967.

35. Letter, SECDEF to CJCS, Nov. 21, 1967.

36. JCSM-719-67, Review of Crop Destruction Operations in South Vietnam, Dec. 29, 1967.

37. "FAS Statement on Biological and Chemical Warfare," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Oct. 1964), pp. 46-47.

38. "Scientists Protest Viet Crop Destruction," Science, Jan. 21, 1966, p. 309.

39. "5000 Scientists Ask Ban on Gas in Vietnam," Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1967, p. A-1.

40. Minutes of the Meeting of the AAAS Council, Washington, D.C., Dec. 30, 1966, p. 9; Letter, Don K. Price to Secretary McNamara, Sept. 13, 1967.

41. Report, "Assessment of Ecological Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of Herbicides," Midwest Research Institute, ARPA - 22 - Order No. 1086, AD824314, Dec. 1, 1967, pp. 290-292.

42. Report, AMEMBASSY Saigon, Report of the Herbicide Policy Review Committee, May 28, 1968, p. I.

43. Message, AMEMBASSY Saigon to SECSTATE, subject: Herbicides, 191300Z Sep 68.

44. Message, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 130830Z Sep 69.

45. History, 12th SOS, Oct.-Dec. 1969, pp. 4, 5, 7, 10.

46. "U.N. Rebuffs United States on Tear Gas Use: Vote Declares Geneva Pact Also Bans Defoliants," New York Times, Dec. 11, 1969.

47. Memo, William P. Rogers to Richard M. Nixon, subject: The Geneva Protocol, Feb. 2, 1971.

48. The Senate finally consented to the ratification of the Geneva Protocol in December 1974 after President Ford agreed to renounce the first use of herbicides except for vegetation control in and immediately around U.S. bases. See Executive Order 11850, April 8, 1975.

49. In its prepublication form, this study by K. Diane Courtney, D.W. Gaylor, M.D. Hogan, H.L. Falk, R.R. Bates and I. Mitchell was titled "Teratogenic Evaluation of 2,4,5-T." It was published under the same title in Science, Vol. 168, May 15, 1970, pp. 864- 866.

50. Memo, DDR&E to SECDEF, subject: Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia, ca. April 15, 1970.

51. Message, JCS to CINCPAC, subject: Restriction on Use of Herbicide Orange, 152135Z Apr 70.

52. History, 12th SOS, April-June 1970, pp. 10-11.

53. Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Ranch Hand Herbicide Operations in SEA, July 13, 1971, pp. 32, 104.

54. Public Law 91-441, Section 501(c), 84 Stat 913.

55. Report, National Academy of Sciences, subject: The Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam,.Part A, Summary and Conclusions, Feb. 1974, pp. xxi-xxiv.

56. Ibid., pp. S-1 - S-6; Letter, Philip Handler to the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and SECDEF, Feb. 15, 1974.

57. Larry Green, "41 Veterans in Midwest Reportedly Show Indications of Viet Herbicide Poisoning," Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1978, p. 16.

58. USAF OEHL Report, pp. VI-28 - VI-30.

59. "Air Force Plans Health Study of Handlers of 'Agent Orange,"' Washington Post, June 5, 1979, p. A-8; Message, OSAF to ALMAJCOM, subject: Herbicide Orange Public Affairs Guidance, 061300Z Jun 79.

60. Report, Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides, National Academy of Sciences, subject: Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 1996, Table 1-1; Report, Committee to Review the Evidence Regarding the Link Between Exposure to Agent Orange and Diabetes, National Academy of Sciences, subject: Veterans and Agent Orange: Herbicide/Dioxin Exposure and Type 2 Diabetes, 2000.

61. Report, Science Advisory Board, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, subject: Herbicide Report: Chemistry and Analysis, Environmental Effects, Agriculture and Other Applied Uses, May 1974, p. 66.

62. This herbicide mixture was for sale at the local Farmers Co-Op as late as 1984.

63. SECDEF Book for March 1962 Meeting, Tab C, subject: Ranch Hand Defoliant Operations, ca. March 1962.

64. Report, Engineer Strategic Study Group, subject: Herbicides and Military Operations, Vol. I, Main Paper, Feb. 1972, pp. ix-x.

Photographs and line drawings are from Operation Ranch Hand

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