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Inchon MacArthur, in his Reminiscences, says: The target date, because of the great tides at Inchon, had to be the middle of September. This meant that the staging for the landing at Inchon would have to be accomplished more rapidly than that of any other large amphibious operation in modern warfare. . . . My plan was opposed by powerful military influences in Washington. The essence of the operation depended upon a great amphibious movement, but the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, was of the considered opinion that such amphibious operations were obsolete—that there would never be another successful movement of this sort. The Attack Force would have come up to Inchon from the Yellow Sea through narrow and tortuous Flying Fish Channel. When the tides went out they ripped through the channel at seven or eight knots, leaving vast mud flats across which even amtracks could not expect to crawl. The hydrographers said the best date would be 15 September. Morning high tide (an incredible 31.2 feet) would be at 0659, evening high tide at 1919. The landing would have to accommodate to these times.Much of the Navy's Amphibious Force was a rusty travesty of the great World War II amphibious armadas. Many of the LSTs to be used in the landing had to be reclaimed from Japanese charters. Some came complete with Japanese crew. Other crews had to be made up from Navy Reserves flown to Japan. Now came an aggravation from another quarter. On 21 August, Congressman Gordon L. McDonough of California had written President Truman urging that the Commandant of the Marine Corps be given a voice in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Truman answered with a tart personal note, ". . . For your information the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's. . . . The Chief of Naval Operations is the Chief of Staff of the Navy of which the Marines are a part. . . The story got into the newspapers on 5 September. Great cries of out rage went up from the public. Next day Truman sent a contrite apology to Gates regretting his choice of language and then manfully appeared at a Marine Corps League banquet by chance being held in Washington, but he did not recant his fundamental beliefs as to where the Marine Corps should fit in the national military establishment. The 1st Marines, staging out of Kobe for Inchon, read about the incident in the Stars and Stripes and chalked on their trucks and tanks, "Horrible Harry's Police Force." The 1st Marine Division would liter ally form on the battlefield. The 5th Marines were loading out of Pusan. The 7th Marines were still on the high seas (one of its battalions had been in the Mediterranean and was coming by way of Suez). On 3 September the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment was assigned to the 1st Marine Division. Lifting the Landing Force would be Amphibious Group 1, under Rear Admiral James H. Doyle. Superimposed on top the Landing Force was X Corps, under Major General Edward M. Almond, USA, MacArthur's former chief of staff. The 7th U. S. Infantry Division would be in reserve. Pyranaided over X Gorps was Joint Task Force 7. There were estimated to be about 2200 second-rate North Korean troops in Inchon. Inland, in the vicinity of Seoul, there were thought to be about 21,500 enemy of better quality. A battalion of the 5th Marines would land at daybreak on Green Beach on Wolini-do, an island separated from Inchon itself by a six-hundred-yard causeway. Then there would be a long wait of twelve hours until evening tide was in and the main landings could be made. The rest of the 5th Marines would then land across Red Beach to the north and the 1st Marines across Blue Beach to the south—although calling them "beaches" was a misnomer; the harbor was edged with sea walls which would have to be scaled with ladders. Air and naval gunfire preparation of the target area began 10 September. L-Hour for Wolmi-do was 0630 on 15 September. BLT 3/5 scrambled ashore, twenty-five minutes later ran up the flag over Radio Hill. "That's it," said MacArthur, watching from the bridge of the command ship Mount McKinley along with Shepherd, Almond, Doyle, and Smith. "Let's get a cup of coffee." During the day the target area became increasingly smudged with smoke from the burning city mixed with rain and fog. H-Hour for the main landings was 1730. No landmarks could be seen in the grayish- green pall, the assault waves crisscrossed during the run in to the sea wall, and all the sorting out wasn't complete before it was pitch black. The X Corps' plan was to move inland following the landing, capture Kimpo airfield, cross the Han, recapture Seoul, and then act as the anvil against which the NKPA would be crushed by an Eighth Army drive up from the south. The axis for the twenty-mile advance to Seoul was the intertwined road and railroad. In the morning the Division moved out, 1st Regiment astride and right of the road, 5th Regiment on the left. On the morning of 17 September, MacArthur and other notables came ashore to visit the front. On the highway they saw the still-smoking hulks of a column of T-34s which had tried a counterattack at dawn. MacArthur gave Craig, Murray, and Puller Silver Stars, and Smith was told that the 7th Infantry Division would land next day and move in on the right of the 1st Marines. That same day, 17 September, Murray's 5th Marines took Kimpo airfield. Swimmers were put across the Han and Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett's 3d Battalion went over in amtracks at dawn on the 20th, followed a few hours later by the 2d Battalion. This put the 5th Marines in position on the high ground north of Seoul 1st Marines, coming up along the Inchon-Seoul Road had found it tougher going, there had been a hard fight at Sosa, and it was the nineteenth before they reached the hills overlooking Yongdong-po, the city that lies across the Han from Seoul. All three battalions of the 1st Marines went in the final attack beginning on 21 September against Yongdong-po. This finished the enemy west of the Han. On the twenty-fourth, Puller's 1st Marines crossed the river. The next day the 1st and 5th Marines went into Seoul itself, the 1st Marines at tacking up Ma Po Boulevard toward Ducksoo Palace, the traditional seat of government. Supporting arms had to be used sparingly because of the civilian populace and the fighting was largely grenade and rifle, barricade-to-barricade, and house-to-house. That night the NKPA tried a final tank-infantry counterattack with everything they had left in the city. It failed, and by the twenty-seventh Seoul was secure. Two days later Syngman Rhee, escorted by MacArthur, made a triumphal re-entry into the capital. On 30 September Litzenberg's 7th Marines, who had joined the 1st Division in Seoul, moved out along the Seoul-Pyongyang highway, reaching Uijongbu, ten miles to the north under the approving eye of visiting General Cates. The 1st Cavalry Division, new armor gleaming, now passed through the 1st Marine Division, which then made a motor march back to Inchon to re-embark. |