The genesis of tanks in the Marine Corps lay in the decision to accept the mission of forcible entry against beaches defended by a determined and well-armed enemy at the center of a naval campaign, which would at the same time require other Marine Corps units to defend islands and coastlines against similar all-out assault. On 5 December 1923, the Marine Corps Light Tank Platoon, East Coast Expeditionary Force, formally organized at Quantico, Virginia, for experimental exercises. With a strength of two officers, 22 men and three M1917 six-ton tanks, borrowed on verbal agreement from the Army, and under command of 1stLt Charles S. Finch (1896-1956), a 1919 Naval Academy graduate, the platoon embarked USS Chamont on 3 January 1924 and headed for Culebra Is. In all, the Corps acquired eight M1917 six-tonners during the twenties enabling the platoon to keep five vehicles on line, despite the frequent overhaul requirements. Because of the detailing of its troops to mail guard duty in 1926-27, however, the platoon had to be reassembled for the greatest challenge of its curious life, the China expedition. Capt. Nathan E. Landon, a former marine gunner commissioned in 1917, assumed command of the platoon, mustering then two officers, 30 enlisted men and five tanks for the 6 April 1927 departure. Under the watchful eye of future commandant Major A. Archer Vandegrift, the 3d Brigade operations and training officer, the light tank platoon conducted training in Tiensin. Upon return to San Diego 31 October 1928, the platoon shipped its vehicles and disbanded on 10 November. The tanks never saw further use and all eight were declared excess property for disposal at Quantico in 1935.
In 1934, the Marine Corps planned two tank companies of 5-ton light tanks for its two proposed brigades. The vehicle selected was the 5-ton, two-man Marmon-Herrington CTL-3. The 1st Tank Company, 1st Marine Brigade stood up at Quantico under Maj. Hartnol J. Withers (1903-1983) , a 1926 graduate of the Naval Academy, on 1 March 1937, although it remained in equipment and personnel a mere platoon for a considerable time. The Marine Corps bought a total of 35 Marmon-Herrington tanks, but the coming of World War II required adoption of Army light and medium tanks for a variety of reasons.
Marine Corps tankers fought on Guadalcanal with two companies of M2A4 and M3 light tanks, with a further three companies joining by the end of the campaign. After 3d Tank Battalion landed at Bougainville in 1943, all subsequent landings would feature the M4 series medium tanks. The flame-thrower tank was first officially used by Marines on Saipan to rout the enemy from caves. Earlier, tankers had improvised flame weapons for light tanks. On Iwo Jima, tank bulldozers were employed to seal enemy bunkers. At the end of the Battle of Okinawa, Major General Lemuel Shepherd wrote in his after-action report that "if any one supporting arm can be singled out as having contributed more than any others during the progress of the campaign, the tank would certainly be selected."
During the Korean Conflict, Marine Corps tanks remained important weapons. The 1st Tank Battalion companies and the antitank platoons of the infantry regiments used the M26 Medium Tank, with supporting M4 series flame and dozer tanks. The tanks of A Company, fighting with the 1st Brigade in Pusan, destroyed 21 North Korean tanks during August, 1950. The M46 Medium Tank, with the 90mm gun, was used in Korea from 1951 through the armistice period for coordinated tank-infantry attacks, defense, counterattack missions, and extensive tank-infantry patrols into enemy held territory.
Tanks landed with other units for peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, 1958, and the Dominican Republic, 1965, and mobilized for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In these operations, the tankers were equipped with the M48A1 (A3 in DomRep) with its ever-reliable 90mm gun.
In tandem with the M48 series tank, Marine Corps tank units operated a flame-thrower version, the M67, in which the main gun was replaced by a flame gun with a 365 gallon flame mixture capacity. Also during this time, the Marine Corps used the M103A1, heavy tank. The M103A1, fitted with the powerful 120mm cannon, was introduced to counter Soviet heavy tank models of the IS and T-10 series in a general support role.In 1958, the heavy recovery vehicle, M51, based on the M103A1 chassis, entered service as the battalion and company level service vehicle, replacing the M32 vehicle, which was the last of the M4 Sherman derivatives to see service.
The standard tank organization in the Marine Corps after the Korean War became the tank battalion of one headquarters and service company and three tank companies. The headquarters and service company operated nine M67 flame tanks and two M48A1 tanks. The company also furnished supply, transportation, maintenance, communication and medical support for the battalion at large. Of the three tank companies, two normally were medium tank companies equipped with M48 series tanks and the third was a heavy tank company equipped with M103 series tanks.
During 1963, the Marine Corps began a major modernization of its tank inventory, fitting all tanks with diesel engines, NBC protection and improved fire control systems. This decision upgraded the tank fleet at a fraction of the cost of acquiring the new M60 tank then entering service with the Army. The Corps saw potential use for the MBT-70 tank project, then on the drawing boards, as the ultimate replacement for its current vehicle.
Tanks landed with the Marine Corps units sent to DaNang to begin the formal campaign in March-July, 1965. Overall command remained with Maj. Gen. William R. "Rip" Collins, the commanding general of III MEF until his normal relief in June, to this day the highest tactical post ever held by a Marine Corps tanker. Within a year, the 1st and 3d Tank Battalions arrived. The 5th Tank Battalion activated in July 1966, a company deploying with the 27th Marines to Vietnam in the summer of 1967. Except for the M103 heavy tank, all the equipment procured in the preceding decade would receive a rigorous trial by fire. Unlike the Korean War, the enemy infantry in Vietnam held capable individual antitank weapons in the form of rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and recoilless rifles.
In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Marine Corps was faced with the increasing obsolescence of the M48-M103 family of tanks and the failure of the Army MBT-70 project. This, combined with the impact of the 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East and the disbanding of the Marine Anti-Tank Battalion in 1970 forced action. In the interim, the Corps phased out the M67A1 and M103A2 vehicles in 1972-74, and added a fourth company of medium tanks to two of its three active tank battalions.
In 1975, the Corps began to replace the M48A3 with M60A1 series tanks in the most modern variant available in the U.S. In 1976, Marine Tank Battalions also established the Anti-Tank Companies. Each battalion had one anti-tank company equipped with 72 jeep-mounted, TOW missile launchers. By 1979, all USMC Tank Battalions (3 1/2 Active, 2 Reserve) operated M60A1 tanks with a stabilized 105mm cannon, passive night sights and driving viewers, "reliability-improved" diesel engines and improved suspension components.
Just prior to the Persian Gulf Crisis, in the summer of 1990, the Marine Corps began converting its tank units to the M1A1 Abrams Tank. A mixture of M1A1 and M60A1 tanks were employed in Desert Shield/Desert Storm by the 3 Active tank battalions and most of the 2 Reserve battalions. All tank units acquitted themselves with overwhelming success against Iraqi tank units.
In the aftermath of the Gulf Conflict, Marine Corps downsizing and modernization continued until only two active and two reserve tank battalions remained, with the antitank companies redistributed to the infantry organizations. Almost 65 years after the procurement of the Marmon-Herrington tanks for the 1st Tank Company, the Marine Corps enjoyed at last a well-equipped tank battalion with superior tanks, fully supported by organic scout, antitank, and bridge launcher sections and capable of coordinating all forms of fire support. However small, the virtues of a technically and tactically superior tank force remain a marked Marine Corps tradition. It only remains for its leaders to take the fullest advantage.
Kenneth W. Estes